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1INTRODUCTION
This essay is an historical analysis of the relationship between the United 
States and the Kurds from the Second World War to the end of the Bush 
administration It will be argued that the US through its foreign policy, 
directly and indirectly, acted to subvert self-determination for the Kurdish 
minorities in Turkey, Iraq and Iran. US policy in this particular case reflects 
an overarching American antipathy towards Third World self-determination in 
general.
During the Cold War, the US justified subversion of Third World self- 
determination on the grounds of containing the Soviet threat. US policy, 
during this period, was, however, a determined and conscious effort to 
extend US hegemony over the world economy. After the onset of the demise 
of the Soviet Union, George Bush continued this policy but laboured under a 
lack of moral justification. To compensate, Bush argued that he was 
attempting to enlarge democratic principles throughout the world. While a 
degree of democracy has emerged in some previously totalitarian and 
authoritarian states, the US has either continued to circumvent self- 
determination in the Third World or provides support for states which deny 
self-determination for their minorities, that is, when such self-determination 
interferes with US national interest. US national interest in this respect can be 
defined as the maintenance and / or enlargement of markets for US business 
interests.
In the Middle East, US policy, whether Cold or post-C'old War, has focused 
on maintaining an ability to influence the supply and price of oil for the 
Western market. In pursuit of this policy the US overtly (Iran 1953-1989 and 
Turkey 1990 - ) and covertly (Iraq 1980 - 1990) sponsored proxies in the
2region to confront threats to the balance of power. The majority of 
the world's Kurdish population reside in these three states. The sole criterion 
for the United States in dealing with the Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq has 
been whether the host state has been a friend or foe at the time. Because of 
this, self-determination for the Kurds has remained secondary to US national 
interest. Moreover, whether or not the state in question is a friend or foe, 
Kurdish self-determination threatens the balance of power in the Middle East. 
Should the Kurds in one state gain autonomy or independence it would have a 
domino effect in other states.
There has been a secondary ideological dimension involved in the US attitude 
towards the Kurds. Since President Truman's institutionalisation of the Cold 
War in 1947 (the Truman Doctrine), US foreign policy makers have 
purposely confused Third World nationalist self-determination with 
communist expansion. Several reasons have been suggested for this mindset. 
Revisionist scholars hold that it emanates from the nature of America's own 
revolution. The American Revolution was not a popular rebellion against the 
British; it was a middle class reaction to high taxes and brakes on mercantile 
expansion. 1 'As a consequence the American definition of what constitutes 
legitimate revolution is so idiosyncratic (basically confined to the attainment 
of "free market" economies) as to be irrelevant to Third World conditions. In 
terms of policy, this peculiar outlook has led the US to operate within the 
modem context as an anti-revolutionary power' [Davidson 1995: 76], The 
revisionists assert that throughout the Cold War the US strove to establish a 
stable capitalist order by way of trade agreements. Whenever instability 
threatened US interests, covert action and military intervention were 
employed to restore the status quo [Merrill 1994: 167-168], 2
3The promotion of the idea of a Soviet threat in the Middle East was primarily 
designed to obfuscate the true nature of US foreign policy. As one scholar has 
argued 'the most striking feature of Soviet policy in the Middle East is not 
how much, but how little, it has been able to maintain a continuous impact 
there and how far states and independent forces in the region have been able 
to defy or manipulate the USSR' [Halliday 1988: 155], Halliday concludes 
that '(the Soviet) support for a variety of states has not consolidated its 
relations with them: Arab states have been unreliable partners, and the Islamic
revolution in Iran has done little to benefit Moscow..........  The impact of
Soviet policy on the Middle East, therefore, has been marginal at best' 
[Halliday 1988: 167]. In relation to the Kurds, as will become apparent, at 
various times, US and Soviet policy coincided to such a degree, that both 
superpowers were attempting to achieve the same ends, albeit for different 
reasons.
Most studies of modem Kurdish history utilise a framework where chapters 
are divided into discrete national units; the Kurds of Iraq, the Kurds of 
Turkey, etc. While such a framework accepts politico-national realities, it fails 
to reflect Kurdish reality. Despite the fact that the Kurds have had artificial 
national borders thrust upon them, ethnic 'Kurdistan' is not limited by 
borders. The Kurds have accepted or denied borders as it suited them. In 
addition, the reaction of host states towards the Kurds is predicated on the 
trans-national nature of the Kurdish ethnos and the fear this engenders within 
host governments.
Studies of postwar Kurdish history usually only obliquely refer to the 
Kurdish issue as it pertains to US relations with Turkey, Iraq and Iran.
4Conversely, studies of these relations relegate the Kurdish issue to 
footnotes. This study will concentrate on the effect the Kurdish issue has had 
on these relations since the Second World War. In doing so it will not 
examine the minutiae of postwar Kurdish history; the Kurds will be the focus 
only to the degree that their actions have impinged on the policies of the 
major players.
The essay will consist o f two chapters. The first chapter will be introduced by 
a discussion of the United States' 'inheritance' o f Britain's hegemony over the 
Middle East. Then, US-regional relations during the period from 1945 to 
1968 will be discussed. This period was characterised by direct US influence 
in the region but indirect action in relation to the Kurds. Following this 
section, the period from 1968 to 1978 will be examined. For a brief interval, 
1972-1975, the US provided active support for the Iraqi Kurds, albeit covert, 
which was disadvantageous for Kurdish self-determination.
The second chapter will begin with the regional situation after the fall of the 
Shah. During this period, the US sought to secure Iraq in place of Iran as its 
'ally'. While neither the US nor Iraq truly trusted each other, the 'marriage of 
convenience' was profitable for both sides. Due to the United States' mistrust 
of Iraq, the importance of Turkey as a regional ally grew. This situation 
reflected disastrously on the Kurds. The US tended to ignore Iraqi and 
Turkish military campaigns against their Kurdish minorities because of 
strategic and financial considerations. The Iranian Kurds did not even enter 
into US consideration. The second half of the chapter will examine the 
aftermath of the Kuwait War, in particular, the Bush administration's reaction 
to the Iraqi civil war, the Kurdish safe haven in northern Iraq and the Kurdish 
election in the safe haven in 1992.
5The conclusion will summarise the effect of US administrations from Nixon 
to Bush on Kurdish self-determination. In addition, brief mention will be 
made of how US policy during this period has affected the Clinton 
administration's relationship with the region and the Kurdish people.
6CHAPTER ONE
THE KURDS AND US FOREIGN POLICY 
1945-1975
INDIRECT ACTION - 1945 - 1968 
Introduction
Before the Second World War, the United States had little interest in the 
Kurds. President Wilson argued that self-determination for minorities 
residing within the pre-war, colonial empires should be addressed at the 
Versailles Peace Conference, 1 however, Wilson's efforts were subverted by 
an isolationist US congress and the demands of the British and the French to 
the contrary. Many minorities did, in fact, achieve a degree of independence 
but only where their independence coincided with British and French policy. 
The Kurds did not fit into this category Despite promises of a Kurdish state 
the idea came to nought due to Kemal Ataturk's success in forging the new 
Turkish republic. The British considered that an independent Kurdish state 
would be inimical to the balance of power in the region. British plans were 
predicated on a united Iraq strong enough to resist any pressures from the 
Turkish republic. The discovery of oil in the Kurdish region of Iraq only 
served to reinforce British interest in the region.
US interest in the Kurds was revived during World War II but then only 
indirectly. During the war the British and the Soviets, worried about the 
(German leaning) 'neutrality' of Reza Shah, invaded Iran and divided it into 
three zones [Saikal 1980: 24-26], The Soviets took the north, the British, the 
south, ostensibly leaving Reza Shah a small central zone around
Tehran. Reza Shah, humiliated, abdicated, and was replaced by his son, 
Mohammed Reza Shah [Saikal 1980: 26], Iran, for the duration of the war, 
became a source of oil for the Allied war effort but just as importantly, a 
conduit for the supply of American Lendlease arms to the Soviets. 
According to a pre-arranged agreement, the British and Soviet occupying 
troops were to leave Iran within six months of the war ending. Whether the 
Soviets based their decision on a desire to expand their influence in the 
region, as claimed by the Allies, or whether they hoped to break the British 
monopoly on Iranian oil, which seems a more cogent argument, the Soviets 
reneged on the agreement [Saikal 1980: 25-35], To further their influence, the 
Soviets backed the Azerbaijanis and Kurds in the establishment of two 
autonomous republics in northern Iran [Chaliand 1994: 74-76],
The 'independent' Azeri republic and the Kurdish republic of Mahabad were 
supplied with Soviet military aid and advisors [Chaliand 1994: 74-76], As will 
become apparent in later discussion, support for the Kurds fitted a pattern 
that has been repeated by both the West and the Soviets. The Soviets were 
mainly interested in furthering their own desires. Self-determination for the 
Kurds, temporarily suited this desire and they were used as Soviet pawns. 
When it became apparent that the Allies would not accept Soviet influence 
within Iran, Winston Churchill implied the use of nuclear weapons, and the 
Soviets withdrew their troops and their support for the Kurds [Saikal 1980: 
34] Mohammed Reza Shah, assisted by the Allies, quickly suppressed the 
short-lived Mahabad Republic. Leaders of the Mahabad republic were 
arrested and later executed [Ghassemlou 1993: 108-110],
Of great significance for later Kurdish history, one leader, Mulla Mustafa
8Barzani, escaped with his forces to the Soviet Union. Barzani was not from 
Iran. His tribal lands were in the area of Iraq which borders Iran. While the 
Mahabad Republic had been a disaster for the Iranian Kurds, it had permitted 
Barzani to found the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iraq (KDP). After the fall 
of Mahabad, Barzani resided in the Soviet Union until 1958.
American interest in the Kurds had been at best fleeting and indirect. More 
important for American interests had been evicting the Soviets from Iran to 
protect Iranian oil for the West. The suppression of the Kurds was a diversion 
and American participation apparently quite marginal, restricted to 
supplying arms and training for the Shah's forces. The fact finding visit of 
Archie Roosevelt, then US military attache, to Mahabad [Roosevelt 1993: 
122-138] and the presence o f H. Norman Schwarzkopf snr. as 'police advisor' 
to the Shah's government [Schwarzkopf (jnr) 1993: 12, 3 Iff] , however, tends 
to belie this argument.
After the fall of the Soviet-backed Kurdish Mahabad republic, the United 
States and the Kurds would have little direct contact for nearly three decades. 
Albeit, as early as 1948 a CIA estimate ominously noted '. .the Kurds are now 
and will continue to be a factor of some importance in any strategic estimate 
of Near East affairs' [quoted in Prados 1986: 313]. In the meantime, 
American policy would continue to impact indirectly on the Kurds.
Because of war debts, indigenous nationalist movements and the policies of 
the post-war Labour government, British military influence in the Middle East 
declined in the years immediately following the war. The United States 
stepped into the vacuum. US policy in the Middle East was ostensibly
9designed to replace the British balance of power with an American one; an 
extension of the traditional British desire to contain Russian, later Soviet, 
expansion into the Persian Gulf. It could be argued, however, that the United 
States played on the decline of the British Empire and the weakness of the 
Soviet Union and that its primary intent was extending American business 
influence in the region at the expense of the British. The United States had 
gained entry to the Saudi oil business before the war but the British controlled 
the Iranian and the Iraqi oil industries much to the chagrin of US oil interests 
[Yergin 1991: 409-78]
Partial evidence for this argument is provided by US actions in relation to the 
Mossadeq affair in Iran in the early 1950s. Mossadeq, a staunch Iranian 
nationalist, backed by leftist (although not controlled by them, as the United 
States and Britain would subsequently claim) and Kurdish elements in Iran, 
was intent on nationalising the Iranian oil industry, thus wresting it from 
British control. Initially, the United States stood on the sidelines as Mossadeq 
and the British struggled to gain the initiative [Eden 1960: 198-203], 
Eventually in mid-1953, the United States, through the CIA, engineered the 
overthrew of Prime Minister Mossadeq and restored the recently exiled Shah 
[Blum 1994], As a consequence, United States oil interests gained an entry 
into the Iranian market. Iranian and Kurdish nationalism as well as British 
influence in Iran were the losers [Yergin 1991: 475-8],
The Iraqi Republic 1958 - 1968
Within two years of Mossadeq's overthrow, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and 
Britain formed the Baghdad Pact. While the United States acted as midwife, it
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declined to join for fear of offending Nasser who saw the Pact as a threat to 
Arab nationalism in the Middle East. The primary objective of the Baghdad 
Pact was to providecollective security against Soviet expansion into the region. For 
Turkey, Iraq and Iran it possessed a secondary benefit. The pact enabled the three 
countries to co-ordinate their security against threats posed by Kurdish nationalists 
[Shekhmous 1992: 140]. The first action taken by the new alliance was a joint 
Iraqi-Iranian offensive against a Kurdish revolt in Iran [Kendal 1993: 64],
The tripartite security blanket was to last only three years. In 1958, Colonel 
Qasim together with fellow officers of the Iraqi army overthrew the monarchy 
and established the republic of Iraq. Qasem, a nationalist, withdrew Iraq from 
the Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact In addition to precluding Western 
protection, the departure from the Baghdad Pact denied Iraq protection 
against Kurdish insurgency. The remaining members of the Pact renamed the 
alliance as the Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO). CENTO was explicitly 
designed to provide 'mutual military assistance in the event of Soviet 
aggression or internal revolts liable to threaten common security' (emphasis 
added) [quoted in Kendal 1993: 64],
Qasim realised that Turkey and Iran would be tempted to sponsor the Iraqi 
Kurds to destabilise Iraq, so he invited Barzani to return from the Soviet 
Union. Barzani returned believing that Qasim would reward the Kurds with 
partial autonomy [Sheikhmous 1992: 140], Qasim, however, was playing the 
traditional Baghdad game of placating the Kurds until he could establish his 
authority. Barzani used his troops to control Qasim's enemies - the 
monarchists, the Ba'athists and rival nationalists within the government. As 
time went on, Qasim realised that Barzani himself had become a threat. By
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1960, Barzani and the KDP were in open revolt against Baghdad. The 
Turkish junta reacted to Barzani's revolt with a warning to its own Kurdish 
minority. Should they revolt 'there will be such a bloodbath that they and their 
country will be washed away' [Statement of General Gursel, Turkish junta 
leader, 16/11/60, quoted in Kendal 1993: 65],
Meanwhile, Qasim was being undermined by his rival, Aref, and also faced 
external problems. Eisenhower reacted to the establishment of the Iraqi 
republic with an 'invasion' of Lebanon to bolster the Western leaning 
government. Eisenhower's 'gunboat diplomacy' was designed as a warning to 
Qasim and other nationalist governments in the Middle East. Again, an 
American president had confused nationalism with communism [Merrill 1994: 
175],
In January 1963, in order to placate Barzani and give himself breathing space 
to confront his rivals, Qasim signed a ceasefire agreement with the Kurds. It 
was too late. Within a month Qasim was overthrown by the Ba'athists. Again, 
Qasim's desperate need for support had led to a risky coalition. Qasim had 
invited the Iraqi Communist Party into the government setting off alarms bells 
in Washington. In Washington's eyes, Qasim was a threat to Western control 
of the Middle East. The CIA supplied the new Ba'athist regime with lists of 
known communist supporters. [Cockburn & Cockburn 1991: 130]; a service 
they would repeat in Indonesia two years later. As would occur in Indonesia, 
the Iraqi Communist Party was neutralised [Miller & Mylroie 1990: 142], By 
the end of 1963, the Ba'ath regime was replaced by Arif.
Initially, Barzani offered to extend the ceasefire, however, by 1964 Barzani
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realised that Kurdish nationalism had no place in Aref s Iraq. Fighting 
resumed between the central government and Barzani's KDP forces which 
were supplied with arms by both Israel and Iran. [Vanly 1993: 151-2,
Chaliand 1994: 59] Although no evidence has emerged to link the United 
States with Israeli and Iranian aid, the circumstances would tend to indicate 
US acquiescence, if not collusion. During the period in question, 1964-66, the Shah 
was still heavily dependent on American financial aid and 'moral' support. Moreover, 
the nationalist regimes in Iraq were an uneasy reminder to the Shah of the 
vulnerability of his own position. As the Shah was so important to US interests, 
undoubtedly his fears would have been reciprocated in Washington. Moreover, given 
the fact that the US in 1965 was engaged in subverting nationalist movements in 
Indonesia and Vietnam it would seem unlikely that the US would be reticent about 
undermining nationalist self-determination in the Middle East [Blum 1986],
After Qasim's coup in 1958, a 'formal trilateral liaison .... was established by 
(Israel's) Mossad with Turkey's National Security Service (TNSS) and Iran's 
(SAVAK)' [CIA document released by the Iranian students in 1979 quoted in 
Cockburn & Cockburn 1991: 100], The liaison grew out of a fear articulated 
by Ben-Gurion to Eisenhower that the three countries might be threatened by 
actions resulting from the coup in Iraq Ben-Gurion saw Turkey as a "weak 
link" in the Western alliance and commenced secret negotiations with the 
Turks [Bar-Zohar 1977: pt.3, 1321-26 in Rabinovich and Reinharz (eds)
1984: 165-171] who were troubled by their own Kurdish problem. The 
trilateral liaison, known as the 'Trident Organisation', was sponsored by the 
US, through the CIA. A further element of the scheme, known as KK 
Mountain, included Mossad working at the behest of the CIA in areas where 
the latter, for various reasons, found it difficult to operate [Cockburn &
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Cockburn 1991: 100] The Israeli support for Barzani would seem to fit this 
pattern.
Considering the ill-placed faith Barzani would later place in the US, it seems 
highly unlikely that Barzani ever discovered from where his aid probably 
came. The aid provided by Iran and Israel, like the aid provided by the 
Soviet Union in 1945-6, was never meant to result in a victory for the Kurds. 
Barzani became once again a pawn duped by masters intent on achieving their 
own ends. Barzani provided a headache for the Iraqis ensuring stability for the 
Shah and lessened the risk o f Iraq assisting in an Arab assault on Israel. From 
this duplicity, the United States continued to maintain a balance of power in 
the Middle East that ensured American control of oil supplies to the West.
Also significant at this time was the rift beginning between the traditional 
tribal supporters of Barzani within the KDP and the younger, educated and 
urbanised elements within the party, represented by Jalal Talabani, who later 
split from Barzani to form the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK). From the 
beginning the KDP had failed to gain support amongst all the Kurdish groups 
within Iraq. Barzani was a tribal leader, and although his exploits before and 
after Mahabad had made him a hero to most Kurds, his revolt was tribal- 
based. During his brief alliance with Qasim, he was periodically at war with 
rival Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq. When Arif assumed power he was 
'simultaneously fighting the Iraqi troops and his opposition within the KDP' 
[Entessar 1984: 918], This continual internecine war within a war made the 
Kurds an even more valuable pawn for external states to cause instability 
within Iraq.
14
COVERT ACTION 1968 - 1975 
Introduction
In 1968, two events occurred that were to have a permanent impact on the 
Kurdish question in Iraq. The Ba'ath were returned to power in July 1968 
after a successful coup, and in November, Richard Nixon was elected 
president of the United States. The new Ba'ath rulers, particularly Saddam 
Hussein, were intent on learning from the mistakes that led to their downfall 
in 1963. The Ba'ath saw three factors as imperative for their survival; 
neutralising their military allies, limiting the Kurdish problem and enacting 
dramatic social and economic change through nationalisation of the oil 
industry. The first was achieved through a succession of government purges 
and the realignment of the military / security apparatus under President al- 
Bakr's and Saddam Hussein's control.
Solutions to the second and third factors were more difficult to implement 
because of outside powers. Iran and Israel continued to supply arms and 
training for Barzani's forces. Iraq's involvement in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War 
and its subsequent hardline stance towards peace with Israel made Iranian 
and Israeli aid for the Kurds imperative. 2 After intense fighting between 
1968 and 1970, Saddam Hussein attempted to neutralise the Kurdish threat 
by offering Barzani a peace agreement (the March 1970 Manifesto). The 
agreement guaranteed Kurdish autonomy but was not to come into effect for 
four years. One of the major points of contention was control of the oil-rich 
Kurdish province of Kirkuk. 3 Saddam Hussein used the four year hiatus to 
Arabise Kirkuk. When Barzani survived an assassination attempt in 
September 1971, undoubtedly sponsored by Saddam Hussein, he was
15
convinced that Saddam had no intention of upholding the agreement.
The Soviet - Iraqi Friendship Treaty
By early 1972, the Ba'ath, now entrenched in power, still needed to solve the 
Kurdish problem and nationalise the oil industry. Saddam Hussein believed 
that both aims could be achieved through a treaty with the Soviet Union. 
Barzani had been a Soviet client since the Second World War. If Iraq became 
friendly with the Soviet Union, the Soviets could intervene on Baghdad's 
behalf to neutralise him. In addition, during the 1960s, relations between Iran 
and the Soviet Union had improved giving the Shah more leeway in his 
campaign against Iraq [Karsh & Rautsi 1991: 76] Saddam Hussein realised 
that a treaty with the Soviet Union would diminish the Iranian threat .
Saddam Hussein, no doubt, realised the dangers of a treaty with the Soviets 
vis-a-vis the negative response a treaty would elicit from Washington but 
there was the even greater danger of attempting to nationalise the oil industry 
without superpower protection, (a lesson Saddam Hussein had learnt from 
the Mossadeq debacle of 1953). Moreover, Saddam Hussein may have been 
aware that the United States was already attempting to destabilise the Ba'ath 
regime. Although, it appears that Barzani had been rebuffed by the Americans 
in the early 1960s, apparently the Ba'ath accession to power kindled their 
interest and the Kurds were perceived by the US to be a 'strategic asset'. In 
August 1969, two US officers attached to CENTO flew to meet Barzani in 
Iran and signed an agreement which guaranteed $14 million in US aid 4 
[Entessar 1992: 119-120], Meanwhile, across the border, American-trained 
Turkish commandos 'launched a vast campaign, raking the Kurdish
countryside under the pretext of a general "arms search'" [Kendal 1993: 78],
A treaty with the Soviets would also halt Soviet attempts to undermine the 
Ba'athist regime In addition to the Israelis, the Iranians and the Americans, 
the Soviets had been supplying Barzani with aid . The Soviets objected to the 
government in Baghdad because of its treatment of the Iraqi Communist 
Party. In addition, they wanted access to Iraqi oil. Support for Barzani, put 
pressure on Baghdad to move in Moscow's direction. In January 1970, 
Saddam visited Moscow to ask them to halt arming the Kurds. Without a 
treaty, the Soviets were not prepared to comply [Timmerman 1992: 11-12].
The Friendship Treaty was signed with the Soviet Union in April 1972. The 
Soviets would supply Baghdad with arms in return for Iraqi oil. The treaty did 
not guarantee Soviet intervention in the event of an attack on Iraq but it did 
provide Baghdad with a de facto security umbrella to resist any Western 
moves against Iraq's impending nationalisation of the oil industry. The Soviets 
had hoped that the treaty would enable them to gain influence with Iraq 
through supply of arms. Saddam Hussein opened a second channel with the 
French to preserve Iraq's independence. The French were displeased with the 
impending nationalisation of their share of the Iraqi oil industry. To assuage 
the French, Saddam offered Paris cut-price oil in return for access to French 
arms. Later, Saddam would play the French and the Soviets off against each 
other through arms sales purchases [Timmerman 1992: 13-34],
US Response
The American and Iranian response was swift and once again entailed the use
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of Barzani as a Western proxy to destabilise the Iraqi regime. On 30 May 
1972, President Nixon and Henry Kissinger arrived in Tehran to visit the Shah 
after holding arms limitations talks with Brezhnev in Moscow During the 
visit, the Shah asked Nixon to provide Iran with unlimited arms supplies and 
$ 16 million in assistance for the KDP to 'make life difficult for (the Shah's) 
Iraqi neighbour and enemy' [Safire New York Times 5/2/76 quoted in Vanly 
1993: 169], The Shah did not need the money, but Barzani, from previous 
experience dating back to 1945, distrusted the Shah. At first, Nixon was 
hesitant, fearing US aid to the Kurds might encourage separatism in the 
region which would favour the Soviets. He relented after a secret meeting 
with his advisor, John B. Connally, who persuaded Nixon of the efficacy of 
the plan [Vanly 1993: 169],
According to a secret 1976 congressional investigation, the Pike R eport,5 
which was leaked to the media, the CIA was given the job of assisting the 
Kurds without State Department knowledge. On his return to Washington, 
Kissinger sent the necessary orders to the CIA to commence covert action. 
The American ambassador in Tehran and the CIA station chief were mortified 
by Kissinger's action [Isaacson 1992: 564], Furthermore, the '40 Committee' 
whose job it was to assess covert actions was presented with a memorandum 
indicating that the aid was already a fait accompli [Shawcross 1988: 165],
The Shah was also given a 'blank cheque' by Nixon to purchase any US arms 
he desired [Horn 1994: 261], short of nuclear weapons [Shawcross 1988: 
163], Nixon's gesture in providing the 'blank cheque' and covert aid for the 
Kurds was linked to his desire to support the Shah as the new 'policeman' of 
the Gulf. Because of the Vietnam debacle, the American public and congress
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were reluctant to support further overseas intervention [Saikal 1980: 205- 
207], To counter this situation, Nixon proclaimed his eponymous doctrine 
on Guam in 1969. The Nixon Doctrine '.... underlined America's new
desire ... to construct a world system in which the United States.... would
help generate strong regional actors, who would secure their own and 
American interests in their respective regions' [Saikal 1980: 205], The Shah's 
Iran was a major focus of this policy.
The American aid to Barzani was merely symbolic; the bulk of his support 
continued to come from the Shah. Barzani was never advised that his allies' 
plans failed to include a Kurdish victory against Iraq A CIA memo of March 
22, 1974 states the position clearly: 'We would think that Iran would not look 
with favor on the establishment of a formalized autonomous government.
Iran, like ourselves, has seen benefit in a stalemate situation ... in which Iraq is 
intrinsically weakened by the Kurds' refusal to relinquish [their] self­
autonomy. Neither Iran nor ourselves wish to see the matter resolved one way 
or the other' [The Village Voice 16/2/76 quoted in Blum 1986], Barzani, 
however, was so taken in by the ruse that he offered to reward the Americans 
with the Kirkuk oil fields when he defeated the Baghdad regime [Karsh & 
Rautsi 1991: 79-80], 6
According to William Safire [New York Times 23/2/76], Marshal Gretchko, 
the Soviet Minister of Defence, arrived in Baghdad just after the 
aforementioned CIA memo was distributed to broker a deal between Iraq and 
the Kurdish rebels. Moscow was worried the continuing civil war was 
threatening Iraqi integrity and placing the regional balance of power too far in 
Iran's and, therefore, the United States' favour. Moscow neither wanted Iraq
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destroyed nor too powerful. The Soviets supported autonomy for the Kurds 
because they believed the end of the civil war would result in a strong Iraq but 
an Iraq forever apprehensive about an autonomous Kurdish state in the north 
[Timmerman 1993: 18], Gretchko hoped to use his influence with both 
Baghdad and Barzani to end the hostilities. Barzani, by this time, was too 
close to the Western camp and before agreeing to meet Gretchko consulted 
with Iran and the United States. The US and Iran advised Barzani to reject 
the deal. The rejection would have far-reaching consequences for the Kurds.
The Iraqis retaliated with a major offensive in the summer of 1974 which the 
Kurds resisted. In fact, the Kurdish resistance was perhaps too effective for 
the Shah's liking. The war had cost Iraq $4 billion thus far and threatened to 
bankrupt the state. From March 1974 to March 1975, the Iraqis suffered 
60,000 military casualties including 16,000 dead. A further 40,000 civilians 
had perished due to 'collateral damage'. Shia solidarity with the regime was 
also threatened. The majority of troops sent to the north were Shia and their 
losses were significant. [Karsh & Rautsi 1991: 81] Iraq had become 
vulnerable to disintegration from within. The Shah feared Barzani might 
succeed in gaining autonomy for the Kurds or perhaps draw him into a war 
with Iraq [Saikal 1980: 170, Chubin & Tripp 1986: 23],
The Turkish Front
Before commencing the offensive, Saddam had shored up another front. On 8 
April, he assured Ankara that Iraq would continue to supply oil to Turkey if 
Ankara remained neutral in the dispute with the KDP [Vanly 1993: 172], 
Turkey kept its border with Iraq closed for the duration of the war. Although
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Turkey was an ally of both the United States and Iran, it felt threatened by the 
Kurdish successes across the border. Turkey was undergoing a constitutional 
crisis in the wake of the election following the 1971 coup [Ahmad 1993: 
148-180], Parliamentary anarchy was matched by the beginning of civil 
disorder involving leftist, rightist and Kurdish groups which would later result 
in the 1980 coup.
On July 20 1974, Turkey invaded Cyprus in response to a Greek initiated 
coup on the island five days before. Although the failed coup led to the 
downfall of the Greek military junta, relations between Greece and Turkey 
continued to deteriorate. On 14 August, the Turks mounted a second invasion 
occupying 40% of the island. [Ahmad 1993: 164-5] The Turkish military was 
over-stretched with war in the south (Cyprus), tension in the West (Greece) 
and the Kurdish insurrection in the southeast. Turkey could ill afford to have 
the Iraqi civil war spill over onto Turkish soil.
Further, Turkey's use of American supplied arms in the invasion of Cyprus 
resulted in a US Congress inspired breach in US-Turkish relations. In early 
1975, Congress instituted an embargo on military aid and sales to Turkey. 
Relations between the US and Turkey were soured until 1978 [US State Dept 
Dispatch 18/2/91], The Turkish military was therefore ill-equipped to 
confront well-armed Kurdish insurgents. And from the US point o f view Iran 
became even more important as its major bastion in the Middle East.
The Algiers Agreement
A solution to the Kurdish problem seemed to open up when Saddam Hussein
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made overtures towards the Shah after the failure of the summer offensive. As 
he possessed the upper hand the Shah was only too willing to negotiate. 7 
Had Barzani succeeded in gaining autonomy, the Iranian Kurds would have 
demanded the same. Moreover, Kissinger had been having problems (because 
of Syrian intransigence in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War) in achieving 
a disengagement between Egypt and Israel. Sadat was open to 
disengagement but feared the Syrian response. Both Sadat and Kissinger 
believed that if Iraq could be neutralised through an agreement with Iran,
Syria would be left with no support for its position. An Egyptian diplomat 
was sent to broker the agreement between Tehran and Baghdad. Tehran 
wanted concessions, particularly a realignment of the border at the Shatt-al- 
Arab waterway. If Iraq would agree to this arrangement and refuse to back 
the Syrians, Tehran would close its northern border with Iraq and withdraw 
its support for the Kurds [Vanly 1993: 170],
Saddam Hussein, although ostensibly still vice president but effectively the 
strongman, was not ready to accede to these demands. The Shah replied by 
increasing aid to the Kurds including provision of anti-tank missiles and 
Iranian operated artillery. To ensure that no weapons could be stockpiled for 
use against the Shah's own troops the Kurds were never given more than a 
three day supply of ammunition. By early 1975, Saddam Hussein had no 
alternative but to sign the Algiers agreement. The Shah gained access to the 
Shatt-al-Arab which he had always coveted while the Iraqis received the 
Shah's guarantee to stop interfering in Iraq's internal affairs. The latter 
translated into a desertion of the KDP. Within six hours of signing the 
agreement Saddam Hussein launched a major offensive against Barzani's 
forces. The Shah had already withdrawn air support and the two regiments
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assigned to assist the Kurds. Within two weeks, Kurdish resistance had 
withered resulting in a population transfer of up to three hundred thousand 
Kurds. In Turkey, Suleyman Demirel had returned to power and saw 
Barzani's defeat as a perfect opportunity to re-commence commando 
operations against his own Kurdish minority [Kendal 1993: 71].
In his memoirs, Nixon failed to disclose the Kurdish episode [ Nixon 1978], 
Kissinger was a little more forthcoming but relegated the episode to a 
paragraph and a defensive footnote [Kissinger 1979: 1264-1265], He claimed 
the policy was successful because of Iraq's limited ability to participate in the 
Arab-Israeli War of 1973. He further claimed that 'the Shah's decision in 1975 
to settle the Kurdish problem with Iraq was based on the judgm ent.... that the 
Kurds were about to be overwhelmed; they could not have been saved 
without the intervention of two Iranian divisions and $300 million in 
assistance from us' [Kissinger 1979: 1265n], It is difficult to reconcile 
Kissinger's belated sympathy for the Kurds with his reputed comment to the 
Pike Committee that 'covert action should not be confused with missionary 
work.' 8
Fragmentation of the Iraqi Kurdish Cause
Barzani's betrayal by the Shah and the United States prompted a split in the 
ranks of the Iraqi Kurds. Jalal Talabani formed the leftist Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) in opposition to Barzani's tribal based KDP. As mentioned 
above the Iraqi Kurdish movement had been moving in this direction for many 
years. The young, urban-educated Kurds were impatient with Barzani's 
methods. 'The PUK was extremely critical of all the old leadership..... It
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accused them of having conducted the revolution by "tribal methods" and of 
being in cahoots with imperialism." Nor was the KDP "provisional leadership" 
[represented by Barzani's sons, Barzani senior having gone into exile] spared, 
they were condemned for "having retained links with the Shah and with 
imperialism'" [Vanly 1993: 188], The younger de-tribalised Kurds adopted a 
more leftist, secularist line.
Saddam's policies after the Algiers Agreement also inadvertently assisted the 
Kurdish cause. Apart from the mass deportations of Kurds from northern 
Iraq, Saddam cleared a security zone 15 kilometres wide from the Iranian to 
the Syrian border and attempted to 'Arabize' much of northern Iraq. The 
resulting social dislocation provided a large pool of disenchanted youth 
prepared to join the guerilla movements. Fighting resumed between the 
Baghdad regime and the KDP and PUK re-commenced in 1976. Due to the 
tension generated by Iraq's deal with Iran and rivalry between the Iraqi and 
Syrian Ba'ath parties, the PUK in particular, received a great deal of support 
from Damascus [Sherzad 1992: 140],
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CHAPTER TWO
THE KURDS AND US FOREIGN POLICY 
1979-  1992
SADDAM HUSSEIN: FROM SPONSOR 
OF TERRORISM TO ’OUR S.O.B.’ 1
Introduction
The combination of the fall of the Shah in 1979, Khomeini's accession to 
power and Iraq's subsequent invasion of Iran should have provided the Kurds 
in Iraq and Iran with an opportunity to re-negotiate their respective positions. 
Because of many factors this was not to be. First, the Kurdish parties in both 
Iraq and Iran were divided. They failed to suppress their rivalry to promote a 
united front; instead the Kurdish parties engaged in an internecine war which 
permitted Iraq and Iran to play the Kurds off against each other . Second, as 
the war progressed and the tide of battle favoured either of the major 
combatants, they would use their advantage to suppress Kurdish 
insurrections. 2 Third, the Turkish coup in 1980 and finally, US policy which 
will both be examined at length in the next two sections.
The Turkish Coup
One week before Iraq invaded Iran, the Turkish military overthrew the 
Demirel government. The Turkish republic had been plagued by leftist,
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rightist and Kurdish terrorism for the previous five years. In defending the 
military takeover, its leader, General Evren, claimed that 'the Turkish armed
forces w e re .... restoring the state authority in an impartial manner' [Ahmad
1993:181], 'Parallel with an economic policy virtually dictated from 
Washington, the 12 September regime also adopted a foreign and military 
policy designed to serve Western interests in the region reeling from the 
impact of the revolution in Iran' [Ahmad 1993: 183],
Many Turks still believe the generals were acting at the behest of the US 
government. [Spain 1984: 19] That the coup occurred days before the Iraqi 
invasion of Iran neips support their argument. Paul B. Henze, then US 
National Security Council officer-in-charge of Turkish affairs, denies that the 
Carter administration was involved in the coup. According to Henze, 
'Washington was indeed relieved when the military intervened, the Carter 
administration would not have discouraged the takeover had it been 
forewarned, but it was glad not to be' [Henze 1991: 106], There is no reason 
to doubt Henze's honesty but given recent disclosures concerning the alleged 
'October Surprise' affair,3 claims by Carter officials that they were fully aware 
of US covert actions are suspect. Gary Sick, then officer-in-charge at the Iran 
desk of the NSC, has alleged that in the late 1970s and up to Reagan's 
inauguration on 20 January 1981, officials disloyal to Carter implemented an 
alternate US foreign policy unbeknownst to Carter and other White House 
employees [Sick 1991],
Considering the effect of the Shah's fall on the Americans, plus the anarchy 
reigning in Turkey prior to the coup and the need for the United States to find 
a replacement for the Shah, it is not inconceivable that some elements of the
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US foreign policy community may have precipitated and / or backed the 
Turkish coup The reactions of the Reagan administration towards Turkey 
over the next few years seems to suggest this. 'To Pentagon strategists 
like General Alexander Haig, Secretary of State in the Reagan administration, 
Turkey became "absolutely irreplaceable" and worth supporting at virtually any price' 
[Ahmad 1993: 206], The US, under Reagan, rewarded the military regime in Turkey 
with IMF credits, postponement of loan credits and increased economic and military 
aid. In addition the US government and media turned a blind eye to the increasingly 
brutal suppression of the Kurds in the southeast. 4
By 1983, the Turkish military's suppression of the Kurds had precipitated a 
widespread Kurdish insurrection. Abdullah Ocalan formed the Kurdish 
Workers' Party (PKK) in November 1978. Previously he had been involved in 
radical leftist student politics while studying in Ankara. Just before the 
military took power in 1980 he escaped to Syria. Two months after the 
military put 20,000 suspected leftists, rightists and Kurdish separatists on trial, 
the PKK (in May 1983) retaliated with an attack on a Turkish army unit in the 
southeast and then escaped over the border into Iraq. Baghdad permitted 
Turkey to cross into northern Iraq in pursuit o f the PKK. In July of the same 
year, the PKK and the KDP signed a protocol permitting the PKK to establish 
bases in KDP controlled areas of Iraq. The protocol included a condemnation 
of imperialism, particularly that of the United States [Gunter 1990: 67-73]. It 
is perversely ironic that many Turks believe the United States sponsored the 
PKK offensive to force Turkey into the war on the side of Iraq. [Gunter 1990:
116] Fearing that an Iranian victory might result in both a change in the 
balance of power in the region and an independent Kurdish state, Turkey 
sided with Baghdad. Saddam Hussein permitted further Turkish incursions
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into northern Iraq Many of these incursions resulted in air strikes on KDP 
and PUK strongholds.
The United States
When the Shah was overthrown, the United States lost its major ally in the 
Middle East. Despite its traditional antipathy towards Baghdad, the US saw 
Saddam Hussein, the 'secular strongman', as more attractive than Ayatollah 
Khomeini, the 'religious zealot'. In American eyes, Khomeini's accession to 
power had produced a catastrophic change in the balance of power in the 
Middle East. The strategic loss occasioned by the fall of the Shah was 
transformed into an emotional loss when Iranian students seized the American 
embassy in Tehran and took its staff hostage.
The last year of Carter's presidency was consumed by the Iranian hostage 
crisis. Carter's administration also initiated the United States' inexorable shift 
towards Saddam Hussein. Although Carter refused to sanction Saddam 
Hussein's invasion of Iran in September 1980, he appears to have been aware 
of it. The Financial Times alleged that US intelligence and satellite data was 
made available to Iraq before the war through friendly Arab governments. 
[Hitchens 1991: 112] Moreover, before the invasion, Brzezinski, Carter's 
hawkish National Security Advisor, stated that he 'would not object to "an 
Iraqi move against Iran'" [Hitchens 1991: 72], Earlier, in July 1980, 
Brzezinski visited Amman ostensibly to meet King Hussein, however, it has 
been claimed that he met senior Iraqi officials to discuss the Iranian situation. 
According to Gary Sick, 'Brzezinski was letting Saddam assume there was a 
green light, because there was no explicit red light. But to say the US planned
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and plotted it all out in advance is simply not true' [ Sick interview quoted in 
Timmerman 1992: 76-77], (It should be noted in passing, that alleged US 
green / red lights towards Saddam Hussein were to have a profound effect 
ten years later.)
When Ronald Reagan defeated Carter in the 1980 election, support for 
Saddam Hussein increased. On 12 April 1981, Reagan sent Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State Draper to Baghdad to discuss US - Iraqi relations [Miller 
& Mylroie 1990: 143], At this point, Saddam was not ready for open relations 
with the US. Because of successful Iranian offensives in 1982, Saddam 
changed his mind. In the same year, the Reagan administration, without 
congressional consultation, removed Iraq from the list of states that promote 
terrorism despite the fact that Iraq's disavowal of terrorism was merely 
cosmetic. [Jentleson 1994: 186-8] To placate Congress, Saddam acquiesced 
to Reagan's demand that Abu Nidal be asked to leave Baghdad but other 
'terrorists' including Abu Abbas of Achille Lauro fame remained in Iraq. 
[Friedman 1993: 134, 179] According to Noel Koch, the Department of 
Defense's director for counterterrorism, 'no one had any doubts about [the 
Iraqis'] continued involvement with terrorism. The real reason was to help 
them succeed in the war against Iran' [ Washington Post interview quoted in 
Miller & Mylroie 1990: 144],
Within a couple of months Iraq itself was engaged in terrorism. In London, on 
3 June 1982, an attempt was made on the Israeli ambassador's life. The 
assassination squad was organised and supplied with weapons by an Iraqi 
intelligence colonel attached to the London embassy [Jentleson 1994: 52, 
Timmerman 1992: 114]. The Israelis, assigning guilt to the Palestinians, used
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the assassination attempt as a pretext to invade Lebanon. It appears that 
Saddam Hussein had hoped for this reaction as he was facing defeat in the 
war against Iran. He offered the Iranians a ceasefire and suggested that Iran 
and Iraq join together in a retaliatory war against Israel. The Iranians declined 
the offer. [Karsh & Rautsi 1991: 165, Jentleson 1994. 52] At the same time, 
with a touch of cynical irony, Saddam in a meeting with Rep. Stephen Solarz 
(NY), accepted Israel's right to exist [Miller & Mylroie 1990: 144]; a 
volteface of Iraq's policy of the previous fifteen years.
Having removed Iraq from the terrorism list, the Reagan administration gave 
the Department of Agriculture authority, through the Commodity Credit 
Corporation (CCC), to advance Iraq $300 million in credits to purchase rice 
and wheat [Jentleson 1994: 42], (By 1987, CCC credits to Iraq totalled $567 
million) The United States' wheat and rice belts are found in the American 
Midwest, the Republican heartland. 'By the end of the (Iran-Iraq) war, Iraq 
was importing around $30 billion worth of food, principally from the United 
States and Turkey' [Sluglett and Farouk-Sluglett 1991: 98], By then, the 
United States was in the midst of recession and the section of the US 
economy that was hurting most was the agricultural sector, particularly the 
Midwest farming belt. As one commentator noted, the administration's policy 
towards Iraq was 'a market-driven quest to relieve the Republican heartland.' 
From 1985-90 the US government provided more than $4 billion in credit 
guarantees and loans to Iraq. ?
Despite ongoing support for Iraq during the two Reagan administrations, the 
US was under no delusion that Saddam Hussein could ever replace the Shah. 
Western interests would be best served if neither Iraq nor Iran won the war.
30
Washington spent the duration of the war ensuring this by engaging in 'low- 
grade Machiavellianism' including 'the apparent "cooking" of intelligence data 
given to the two sides' [Bell 1989: 138], Furthermore, while supporting the 
Iraqi side in the UN and through the flagging of Kuwaiti tankers, the Reagan 
White House covertly supplied arms to Iran; the infamous Iran-Contra deals 
which nearly brought down the Reagan presidency.
The Anfal Campaign
During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein used chemical and biological 
weapons against Iranian mass attacks. Towards the end of the war, when US 
assistance had given him the upper hand, he turned the weapons on the Kurds. 
The first chemical attacks occurred in May 1987 and continued into June 
when Kurdish villages in Iran were gassed. In March 1988, the most 
(in)famous attack occurred when the Kurdish town of Halabja was bombed 
with chemical laden shells.
The chemical attacks resulted in 55,000 Kurdish refugees fleeing towards the 
Turkish border. Turkey was forced to admit the Kurds but denied them 
refugee status relying on a loophole in the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees which refers only to European refugees [Kirisci 1993: 5- 
7], Meanwhile, the Turkish military was engaged in its own offensive against 
the Kurds in the southeast. In September 1988, both governments rejected 
United Nations' requests to send teams to assess the situation [Chaliand 
1994: 71].
While the chemical attacks have received the most publicity, particularly after
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the Kuwait War, they formed only part of a well-organised genocidal 
offensive against the Kurdish population of Iraq, the Anfal campaign, which 
lasted from April 1987 to April 1989. The Kurdish insurrections during the 
Iran-Iraq War provided the catalyst for the campaign but the war was a cover 
for the campaign not a pretext. As discussed above 'the Iraqi regime's anti- 
Kurdish drive dates back ... more than fifteen years, well before the outbreak 
of that war' [Salih 1995],
Baghdad did not attempt to disguise the Anfal campaign; it was celebrated 
with the same degree of nationalistic triumphalism that distinguished its 
victories in the Iran-Iraq War. In response, the US Senate in 1988 
unanimously passed the 'Prevention of Genocide Act' which mandated a trade 
embargo on Iraq. The White House opposed the legislation and used various 
procedures to have it delayed in the House. It eventually died [Miller & 
Mylroie 1990: 148]. Reagan subsequently approved a further $1 billion in 
CCC credits for Iraq to purchase agricultural commodities [Entessar 1992: 
139], The Reagan administration was primarily concerned with the 
continuing risk of Islamic revolution in the Middle East. Iraq was viewed as 
the only possible candidate to contain Iran. Therefore, the White House 
accepted Saddam's promise not to use chemical weapons in the future [Karsh 
& Rautsi 1991: 199], When Bush succeeded Reagan, US policy followed the 
same pattern.
On 2 October, 1989, Bush signed the then classified National Security 
Directive 26 (NSD 26) which stated that 'normal relations (with Iraq)... would 
serve ... (US) interests and promote stability in the Middle East.' In particular, 
'economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behaviour (were to
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be investigated and attempts made) to increase our influence in Iraq'. Mention 
was made of Iraqi chemical, biological and possible nuclear weapons, human 
rights abuses and Iraqi interference in neighbouring countries, however, the 
main thrust of the directive to 'pursue and ... facilitate, opportunities for US 
firms to participate in ... reconstruction of (the) Iraqi economy, particularly in 
the energy area.' The United States was not limited to economic cooperation 
with Iraq, 'sales of non-lethal forms of military assistance, e g. training courses 
and medical exchanges, on a case by case basis' could also be promoted 
[Simpson 1995: 907-909],
As for the Kurdish deaths caused by chemical attacks, the New York Times 
reported in April 1991 that 'recent studies by the Bush administration .... 
suggest that the deaths occurred "during fierce fighting in the final months of 
the Iran-Iraq war.'" According to the Times, the administration tried to cloud 
the issue further by suggesting that 'both sides used chemical weapons' and 
therefore 'there probably wasn't an attempt on either side to kill the villagers, 
but instead, they were fighting over territory' [ quoted in Smith 1992: 45],
The Business of the United States is Business
Had the Shah of Iran survived, no doubt, at some point the United States 
would have destabilised the Iraqi regime. Baghdad had committed two 
cardinal sins the US abhorred; it nationalised the oil industry and followed an 
independent foreign policy unlike other Arab states which after nationalisation 
tended to acquiesce to the US inspired balance of power in the Middle East. 
(Barzani appears to have recognised this when he offered the Americans the 
Mosul oilfields in 1972) However, because o f the Shah's overthrow, the
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United States needed the Ba'ath regime and the Ba'ath regime needed 
American technology and agricultural produce. Baghdad's importance to the 
United States was not solely predicated on the need for a bulwark against 
the Islamic regime in Tehran. The 'loss' of Iran had entailed a significant 
economic loss for American business, particularly the military-industrial 
complex and development / construction firms. Iran, like Saudi Arabia, was a 
major American arms purchaser and unlike Egypt and Israel paid for arms 
with its own money.
As noted above, Iraq throughout the 1980s, became a major purchaser of US 
agricultural produce through the CCC program. When congress and other 
critics demanded that Iraq be embargoed the Reagan administration resisted 
the moves. The 'Prevention of Genocide Act', which the White House 
effectively destroyed, had been sponsored by the strange alliance of Senators 
Pell and Helms, the former an Eastern liberal, the latter a staunch conservative 
from the South, neither represented the wheat and rice belt. The Senate 
unanimously voted for the bill but over the following two years senators from 
the Midwest engaged in a program of support for the continuation of CCC 
credits to Iraq. In early 1990, Senator Robert Dole led a delegation to Iraq to 
convince Saddam Hussein that the United States still viewed Iraq as a strong 
ally. During this visit the Senators condemned the American media's attacks 
on Saddam Hussein and reassured him of Bush's continued personal support 
[Transcript of Meeting between US Senators And Saddam Hussein, Baghdad, 
12/4/90 in Ridgeway (ed) 1991: 35-38], After the invasion of Kuwait, on the 
eve of sanctions being passed, Republican senators were still engaged in a 
rearguard action to continue CCC credits to Iraq [Waller 1990: 13-14],
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The notion that US business success equates with US national interest is not a 
recent phenomenon and deserves further investigation. US business interests 
have converged with US foreign policy in many Cold War interventions. In 
1954, the US State Department and the CIA helped overthrow the nationalist 
government of Guatemala led by Guzman Arbenz on the pretext that Arbenz 
was a dupe of the Communists. In actual fact, the Soviet Union had little or 
no interest in Guatemala. [Blum 1986: chap. 10] It was not revealed until 
much later that the Secretary of State and the CIA director, John Foster and 
Allen Dulles, were major stockholders in the United Fruit Company which 
had most to lose from Arbenz's policies [Horowitz 1971: 169], The previous 
year, the brothers Dulles had been instrumental in the overthrow of Mossadeq 
in Iran. Again their links with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were not 
revealed until much later [Horowitz 1971: 185],
During the period 1971-73, the United States used its Export-Import Bank 
and influence over the World Bank to strangle the Chilean economy because 
the socialist government of Salvador Allende 'threatened' the interests of the 
US multinational, ITT (known as AT & T within the United States and 
subsequently overseas). When this failed the CIA backed a military coup 
[Blum 1986: chap. 34], Allende's election victory in 1970 prompted another 
of Henry Kissinger's famous quips, 'I don't see why we need to stand by and 
watch a country go communist because of the irresponsibility of its own 
people' [quoted in Blum 1986].
The convergence of business and national interest is also evident in the United 
States' non-agricultural trade relationship with Iraq 6 It is far beyond the 
scope of this essay to outline the full relationship between US business
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interests, the Reagan-Bush White Houses and Iraq, however, a discussion of 
some aspects may elucidate why the United States was loathe to ostracise 
Iraq even after the Anfal campaign against the Kurds. 7
The first thaw in US-Iraq relations occurred in 1979 within months of the 
Islamic revolution in Iran. Iraq had signed contracts with an Italian firm to 
purchase a turnkey navy. The Italian contract was premised on the same 
grounds as the earlier trade with the French, freeing Iraq from dependence 
on the Soviets. To the surprise of the Italians Iraq demanded that the new 
navy be fitted with US built General Electric engines. The US Commerce 
Department agreed to the sale, but in February 1980, the US Senate blocked 
it because Iraq was on the 'terrorism list'. The Carter White House and the 
State Department worked hard to overturn the Senate's decision. Eventually 
the sale went through, in addition to a Carter backed sale of Boeing jets 
[Timmerman 1992: 78], It should be remembered that Ronald Reagan had 
been both an employee and associate of General Electric [Cannon: 1991: 
various references]. Such 'coincidences' continued to 'crop up' over the next 
decade.
On June 25, 1982, Reagan replaced Alexander Haig with George Schultz as 
Secretary of State. Shultz was the president of Bechtel Corporation, one of 
the largest building contractors in the world, with immense interests in the 
Middle East [Cannon 1991: 204-205], (Previously Reagan had appointed the 
general counsel of Bechtel, Caspar Weinberger, his Secretary of Defense). 
During the Reagan presidency, Bechtel was to win two $1 billion contracts 
with the Iraqi government. The first, to build an oil pipeline from Iraq to 
Aqaba in Jordan [Friedman 1993: 29] and the second, to build a
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petrochemical complex south of Baghdad It has been alleged that the latter 
could have been used for mustard gas and fuel air explosive (napalm) 
production [Timmerman 1992: 360].
In May 1985, Marshall Wiley, recently retired from the State Department, set 
up the US - Iraq Business Forum supported by sponsorship from 
Westinghouse (a major high-tech and weapons producer) and Mobil Oil. 
Although the Forum was never registered as a lobby for the Iraqi 
government, the Forum became the major conduit for American business with 
Iraq [Timmerman 1992: 219-20], The growth in membership of the Forum 
was as dramatic as the increase in American sales to Iraq, from approximately 
$400 million in 1985 to $1.5 billion in 1989 [Conason 1990: 15]. By July 
1990, the Forum included more than seventy of Fortune magazine's 'Top 
500' companies . Among these were A T. & T. (of Chile fame), Bechtel 
Corporation, several oil companies (Amoco, British Petroleum, Exxon, Hunt 
Oil of Texas, Mobil and Texaco) and defence contractors ( Bell Helicopter, 
General Motors and Westinghouse Electric).
In May 1988, two months after Iraq gassed Halabja, the Forum sponsored a 
seminar on Iraq in Washington. Guest speakers included the Iraqi 
ambassador, the Iraqi oil minister and A. Peter Burleigh, deputy assistant 
secretary of state for Near Eastern Affairs. In his address, Burleigh stated that 
the Reagan administration 'looked "to those in the ... Forum to help preserve - 
and expand - the overall US-Iraqi relationship ..."' [Conason 1990: 15] Within 
months, Wiley was pressuring the White House to quash Senate attempts to 
place a commercial embargo on Iraq. (The Pell - Helms Act) Because of 
media pressure, the White House publicly condemned Iraq's campaign against
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the Kurds but privately sent Iraq a letter of conciliation. [Gigot 1991: 5],
In November 1988, Bush won the presidential election and appointed his 
close associates James A. Baker III, General Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence 
Eagleburger, Secretary of State, National Security Advisor and Under 
Secretary of State, respectively. In his recent memoirs, Baker claims that 
close friendships between members of the Bush administration resulted in one 
of the most cohesive executive branches in recent history [Baker 1995: 17- 
37], Both Bush and Baker had been involved in the Texas oil industry. 
According to a disclosure made by Baker when he was appointed Secretary of 
State, he held stock in Amoco, Exxon, Texaco and United Technologies, ail 
members of the US-Iraqi Business Forum ['Holdings of James A. Baker III, 
and his Immediate Family', 25/1/89 in Friedman 1993: 342],
Brent Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger left jobs with Kissinger 
Associates to accept their government appointments. Although Kissinger 
Associates was not a member of the Forum, many of its clients 'received 
export licences for exports to Iraq' [ Financial Times 26/4/91], According to 
documents released by the House Banking Conmmittee, Scowcroft held 
significant shareholdings in six major Forum companies including Mobil Oil 
and General Motors [Letter from Henry Gonzalez, Chairman, Committee on 
Banking, Finance & Urban Affairs to George Bush 2/5/91; Financial 
Times 26/4/91], General Motors had done business with Iraq since the early 
1980s but their greatest coup occurred in 1989 when they won a contract 
worth $ 1 billion to supply the Iraqi Interior Ministry with military trucks 
[Timmerman 1992: 347], Iraq financed the purchase of the trucks (and many 
other contracts with Forum members) through loans from the Italian
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government owned Banco Nazionale del Lavoro (BNL) on whose 
international advisory board Henry Kissinger sat as a paid member. Lawrence 
Eagleburger had been on the board of BNL's Yugoslav subsidiary after he had 
served there as American ambassador.
BNL emerged as the central focus of what became known as the Iraqgate 
scandal. It was alleged that the bank's Atlanta (GA) branch provided Iraq with 
loans for illegal purchases of US high-tech goods. Further allegations 
concerned the bank's conversion of CCC credits, permitting the Iraqi 
government to finance its arms industry through US agricultural credits.
When the BNL scandal broke in May 1990 the Bush administration secretly 
terminated CCC credits to Iraq. [Karabell 1995: 43] In January 1995, the 
Department of Justice's (DOJ) investigator's 'found no evidence "that US 
agencies or officials illegally armed Iraq or that crimes were committed 
through bartering of CCC commodities for military equipment'" [Arms Sales 
Monitor 28 (15/2/95): 4], Subsequently, the DOJ announced that the 
Department of Agriculture's CCC would pay BNL $400 million to settle its 
claims on the US government [DOJ Press Release 16/2/95], Some have 
alleged that no other conclusion was possible. House Banking Chairman,
Henry Gonzalez, a Democrat from Texas, who led the call for an 
investigation, claims that the Department of Agriculture destroyed all the 
incriminating evidence in a weekend shredding spree just prior to the 
November 1992 presidential election [Pizzo, Fricker & Hogan Jan/Feb 1993: 1], 8
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The Anfal campaign provoked little response from the Bush administration 
and Britain's Thatcher government. It was left to other Western governments 
to air their indignation. As has been suggested above, it was not in US 
national interest to chastise Saddam Hussein for his genocidal offensive 
against the Kurds. With the Iran-Iraq War over, and neither side victorious, 
the Kurds were a superfluous hindrance to US economic policies in the 
Middle East. The same could be said of Margaret Thatcher's Conservative 
government. The British government was as much involved in coddling 
Saddam for profit as the US was. According to the recently released Scott 
Report, members of the British government were engaged in actions as 
questionable as those of their 'cousins' across the Atlantic [The Times 
16/2/96; The Electronic Telegraph 16/2/96],
It was therefore surprising that when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait the 
most vehement opposition emanated from Britain and the United States led by 
Margaret Thatcher and George Bush. Conventional wisdom supports the 
thesis, posited by both Bush and James A. Baker, that it was imperative to 
intervene on Kuwait's behalf because of the threat Saddam's control of Iraqi 
and Kuwaiti oil posed to Western oil supplies.9 Telhami has cogently argued 
that oil was a factor but not the only factor. He points out that despite 
Japanese and German dependence on Middle Eastern oil, they were, initially, 
the most reluctant to join the US-British coalition against Iraq [Telhami 1994: 
154-5], Britain and the United States, of course, possess their own oil.
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Moreover, the major American and British oil companies were members of 
the US-Iraqi Business Forum. The increase in oil prices, desired by Iraq, 
could only have benefited them.
The US-British response may have been precipitated by other factors. Scott 
has argued that the estimated $250 billion invested by Kuwait in the UK and 
the US may have prompted the Anglo-American response [Scott 1991: 161 - 
3], Had Saddam gained control of Kuwait's investments he could have held 
Britain and the US to ransom as he wreaked havoc with their economies. The 
theory is attractive for two reasons. First, if the solution to the crisis had been 
left to the Arabs, eventually, an Iraqi puppet government wouid have 
achieved legitimacy. In the first weeks of the crisis Saddam claimed that he 
had been 'invited' into Kuwait by opposition elements opposed to the al-Sabah 
monarchy. He did not annex Kuwait as an Iraqi province until late August 
(after the formation of the coalition). Given Arab antipathy towards the 
Kuwaiti monarchy, there seems little reason to believe that the Arabs would 
have independently challenged Saddam. Furthermore, Iraq possessed the best 
military machine in the Middle East. For the Arabs to confront Iraq, they 
would have needed Iranian assistance - an unthinkable proposition.
Second, on 24 February in a speech delivered at the Arab Co-operation 
Council (ACC) in Amman, Saddam Hussein 'voiced his worry that with the 
decline of the USSR, the United States would behave in an "undisciplined and 
irresponsible" manner' in the Middle East. He, therefore, recommended that 
'just as Israel controls interests to put pressure on the administration, 
hundreds of billions invested by the Arabs in the United States and the West 
(should) be similarly deployed .. some of these
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investments may be diverted to the USSR and East European countries' 
[quoted in Cockburn & Cohen 1991: 10]. At the time, the US ignored the 
speech. The US was used to Saddam scoring points against them in the 
Middle East while continuing to rely on American credits and investment. 
Perhaps, after the invasion, Bush and Thatcher feared that he might really 
come through with his threats.
A second factor coincides with Scott's argument. Since the end of the First 
World War, British, followed by American, primacy over the world economy 
has been bolstered by control of Middle Eastern oil. By the late 1980s, the 
British and American economies were floundering while the Japanese and 
German economies were flourishing. American hegemony in the Middle East 
was one of the few levers the Anglo-American alliance possessed to stave off 
the Japanese-German threat [Chomsky 2/91], If Saddam Hussein had gained 
control of Kuwaiti oil and hegemony over the Middle East, the United States 
would have been denied control over Japanese and German oil supplies. 
Moreover, if Saddam had decided to replace Anglo-American investment with 
German-Japanese, undoubtedly Japan and Germany would have gleefully 
accepted the offer. This may explain why the Germans and the Japanese were 
initially reluctant to support the Anglo-American coalition.
In the end, it was not the threat to Western oil that was important, it was the 
threat to American control of Western oil supplies and Arab investment. On 
these grounds it is difficult to argue with Chomsky's contention that 'Saddam 
Hussein's crimes were of no account until he committed the crime of 
disobedience' [Chomsky 1993: 89],
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Turkey and the Kuwait War
Before turning to the effect of the Kuwait War on the Iraqi Kurds it is 
necessary to examine the background of Turkey's support for the US in the 
build-up to Operation Desert Storm. With the demise of the Soviet threat, 
Turkey was adrift in world politics. For the previous forty four years, in the 
eyes of the West, its raison d'etre had been as the southeastern flank of 
NATO. A history of military coups and flagrant suppression of democratic 
and human rights were ignored by successive US administrations intent on 
retaining Turkey as a bulwark against the Soviet Union.
The onset of the Gulf Crisis generated few strong feelings o f antipathy 
towards Iraq amongst the Turkish populace or military. Turkey had co­
operated with Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War to suppress both Turkish and 
Iraqi Kurdish insurrection. Iraq had also been forced to rely on a pipeline that 
ran through Turkey to export its oil. The pipeline provided Turkey with a 
revenue of $500 million p.a. and access to cheap oil. Despite the benefits to 
Turkey, President Ozal perceived that co-operation with President Bush was 
in Turkey's future interest. Many factors prompted this decision. The PKK 
insurgency in the southeast was intensifying and adverse publicity generated 
by the government's suppression of the insurrection was damaging Turkey's 
credibility. Members of the US Congress and European Parliament never 
failed to chastise Turkey over its handling of the Kurdish problem. Turkish 
military equipment was also rapidly becoming obsolete, hampering its ability 
to prosecute the Kurdish war. Without the Cold War, Turkey's importance to 
the United States might dissipate to the point where the US Congress could 
successfully argue for a reduction in military assistance. By supporting Bush,
43
Turkey's profile in Washington would rise dramatically, 
facilitating potential economic and political benefits. Last, and politically 
crucial to Ozal, public support for his Motherland Party (ANAP) had dropped 
to 22% and while Ozal (for the time being) was safe in his position, his 
parliamentary colleagues faced an election the following year. Like Bush,
Ozal incorrectly believed that success in the Gulf would later translate into 
political victory. (ANAP was defeated by Demirel's True Path Party (DYP) in 
late 1991).
Bush immediately embraced Ozal's support, later declaring him 'a protector of 
peace ... who stand(s) up for 'civilised values' around the worid' [Chomsky 2 / 
1991], While standing up for 'civilised values', Ozal, in early August, used the 
cover of the Gulf crisis to suspend the European Convention on Human 
Rights in the Kurdish provinces. This move elicited little protest from Western 
governments [Human Rights Watch Report, 1991 cited in Chomsky, 2/
1991], As the crisis developed the Turkish military intensified its war against 
the Kurds in the southeast. In addition, Ozal agreed to support Bush's war on 
the proviso that whatever the outcome, no independent Kurdish state be 
established in northern Iraq [McDowall 1992: 115].
Ozal's secret diplomacy with Bush and his failure to consult with his 
colleagues led to the resignation of his foreign and defence ministers in 
October 1990. These resignations were followed on December 3 by that of 
the Turkish military's Chief o f Staff, General Torumtay. Whether Torumtay 
resigned because of disagreement with the president's war policy or because 
of the slight he felt at not being properly consulted is still a matter of dispute 
[Ahmad 1993: 201], Whatever the reason many Turks felt that Ozal's
44
adventurist policy negated the legacy of Kemalist foreign policy which was 
represented by the slogan 'Peace at home, Peace abroad'. As will be discussed 
below, Ozal's political gamble paid off in the aftermath of the Gulf War and in 
subsequent US-Turkish relations.
The Kurdish-Shia Revolt
In a report prepared by the Bush transition team in January 1989, foreign 
policy analysts concluded that "in no way should we associate ourselves with 
the 60 year Kurdish rebellion in Iraq or oppose Iraq's legitimate attempts to 
suppress it'" (emphasis added) [Bill & Springborg 1994: 388]. It should be 
remembered that nine months prior to the preparation of the report Saddam's 
'legitimate attempts' to suppress the Kurds included gassing women and 
children in Halabja. The tone for the Bush administration's attitude towards 
the Kurdish rebellion was already set.
Further evidence of the administration's ambivalent attitude towards self- 
determination occurred in the week before the war started. In early January, 
tension mounted in the Baltic republics. By January 11, tension in Lithuania 
had translated into mass protests against the Soviet government which 
replied by sending in commandos who fired on one demonstration and then 
surrounded the television station and other strategically important buildings. 
European governments were outraged by the crackdown and threatened to 
deny further aid to the Soviet Union. As James Baker recounted in his 
memoirs, the United States found itself in an invidious position. In normal 
circumstances, US reaction would have been loud and vocal, however, with 
two days to go before the start of Desert Storm, Baker found 'crafting the
appropriate response to the situation ... tricky.' On the one hand, the US 
government was morally required to protest the use of force by the Soviets. 
Not to do so would have brought strong condemnation from the White 
House's critics in Congress. On the other hand, 'coming down too hard might 
embolden (Gorbachev's) critics and weaken his standing, which obviously was 
contrary to American strategic interests ' (emphasis added) In the end, Baker 
'struck (a) ... delicate balance' by advising the Soviets that 'peaceful dialogue, 
not force is the only path to long-term legitimacy and stability' [Baker 1995: 
178-80].
Bearing these two episodes in mind, the White House reaction to the Kurdish 
and Shia revolts after the Kuwait War is not surprising. Throughout the 
Kuwait War, Bush and the White House called on the 'people and army' of 
Iraq to overthrow Saddam Hussein After the ceasefire the calls continued 
publicly and allegedly covertly via CIA clandestine radio broadcasts into Iraq 
[Kondracke 1991: 11] The people and army (or at least retreating officers 
and conscripts retreating into Iraq) did take up the call and insurrections 
broke out first in the Shia south and later in the Kurdish north. The Iraqi 
opposition expected the US to assist the revolts given the calls that 
precipitated the revolt. The US, however, ordered its troops to desist from 
assisting the rebels. This order included denying rebel generals access to Iraqi 
weapons dumps in the south [Chomsky 1994: 8],
The Republican Guard quelled the revolts with attack helicopters. At the 
ceasefire meeting at Safwan, the Iraqi generals had requested permission from 
General Schwarzkopf to continue using their helicopters because of the 
damage caused to the Iraqi road and bridge system by the allied air assault.
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As Schwarzkopf himself flew to Safwan and saw the degree of devastation, 
he acquiesced to their request. Later, when it became evident that attack 
helicopters were the prime tool used by the Iraqi military for suppressing the 
Kurdish and Shia revolts, Schwarzkopf claimed that he had been 'snookered'. 
Recently, however, he claimed that he hadn't been snookered at all; the initial 
request had been made in the spirit it was given; in other words the Iraqis only 
later realised that they were left with an effective weapon to quell the revolts. 
[PBS Frontline 1996] Baker defends the decision not to shoot down the 
helicopters on the grounds that General Powell advised that such action 
would have dragged the US into the civil war [Baker 1995: 440; also c f  
Kondracke 1991: 11]. In effect, the US military wittingly or unwittingly 
assisted in the suppression of the Shia and Kurdish revolts.
The Iraqi assault on Kurdistan began on 28 March and by 30 March, Kirkuk 
had been retaken followed by Sulaymaniya on 2 April. Despite calls from the 
Iraqi opposition, Bush refused to intervene The Iraqi opposition believes that 
Bush was acting at the behest of Turkey and Saudi Arabia [Kondracke 1991: 
11; McDowall 1992: 117]. This reasoning seems partly correct. Ankara was 
adamant that the Kurdish rebellion should not result in Kurdish independence. 
The Saudis were fearful of a Shia state on their doorstep. But if the argument 
is accepted it tends to absolve the White House of responsibility for the 
disaster when, in fact, the White House itself was leary of the Shias and the 
Kurds attaining victory. The White House refused to contemplate a divided 
Iraq, with Iran dominating the south and Turkey threatened in the north. 
Should division occur, wthin months, US forces would probably have been 
back in the Gulf combatting Iranians.
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As the disaster unfolded, Bush continued to sit on his hands in Washington, 
denying audience to Talabani and other leaders of the Iraqi opposition. When 
the opposition leaders publicly reminded Bush of the encouragement he had 
given them, his aides went into spin control. They 'pointed out that Bush had 
said that if the Iraqi people "and the army" rose up, the international 
community would support them. Because the Iraqi army never rose up and
rebelled......the United States was unable to come to the aid of the Kurds
and the Shiites' [Editors, US News and World Report 1992: 403],
Bush's defence deserves further examination. Leaving aside the fact that 
many of the rebels were retreating Iraqi officers (including generals) and 
conscripts, it is hard to reconcile Bush's defence with traditional American 
attitudes towards spreading democracy across the world. The Cold War had 
been fought ostensibly to liberate humanity from the 'slavery' of Soviet 
communism. But in 1991, the president of the United States was arguing that 
a popular revolt against an authoritarian regime was insufficient to gain 
legitimacy in the eyes of the world in general, and the United States in 
particular. Achieving legitimacy, according to George Bush , necessitates the 
military overthrowing a dictator and replacing him with an oligarchy of the 
United States' liking. For the first time an American president admitted what 
many had claimed for decades: the United States prefers stable military 
governments to popular revolutions, however, democratic. As one scholar has 
remarked, one legacy of the Cold War has persisted in the New World Order, 
a US 'commitment to unsavoury regimes' [Merrill 1984: 181]. The restoration 
of the al-Sabah monarchy in Kuwait, the cited justification for the war, is an 
apt example.
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The Bush argument for restraint in the civil war was destroyed by James 
Baker in his recently published memoirs. He admits that the decision was 
made on 'geopolitical' grounds. The Iranian president, Rafsanjani, had been 
calling for the overthrow of the Saddam regime by the Shia in the south The 
White House was still worried about the spread of 'Iranian fundamentalism' in 
the region and fearful of'inadvertently helping the ayatollahs in Tehran by 
helping the Shia in Iraq.' In the north the Kurds were 'very fragmented' and 
posed a threat to Turkish integrity. The worst case scenario would have been 
the 'Lebanonization of Iraq' and this eventuality was not in the interests of the 
US or the region [Baker 1995: 439],
Operation Provide Comfort
As the Republican Guard pushed north into Kurdistan, 2,000,000 Kurds fled 
towards the Turkish and Iranian borders. Kurdish sources have suggested two 
reasons for the magnitude of the refugee problem. The first was a feeling of 
betrayal by the US. The US had called for the revolt but failed to support it. It 
was 1975 re-visited. In addition, despite US proscription of fixed-wing 
aircraft, many Kurds claimed they had been attacked by Iraqi jet fighters and 
bombers [Bierman 1991: 36], The second, memory of the Anfal campaign 
was still fresh. The Kurds were terrified that Saddam would use gas again but 
this time annihilate them [Korn 1991],
Initially, the Iranians threatened to close their borders but relented. They were 
to receive the bulk of the refugees (1 .2- 1.5 million) but the least aid from 
the outside world to cope with the situation . The US argued that the Iranians 
had refused much of the aid offered because the Iranians were fearful of a
Western presence on their soil. The Iranians argued that very little aid was in 
fact offered.
On the Turkish side, Ozal closed the border as soon as the human waves 
began approaching. He wanted some form of UN support before allowing 
thousands of refugees into Turkey [Kirisci 1993: 1] , He felt justified in doing 
this because after the Anfal campaign in 1988 Turkey had accepted thousands 
of Kurdish refugees but also received little aid from the outside world. The 
primitive camps provided by the Turks had provoked a strong response from 
the Europeans. (The Turks retorted that the Europeans were practising a 
double standard because they had refused to adequately assist Turkey or 
accept refugees themselves) [Kirisci 1993: 10].
The Turkish government, buoyed by their new found position in the New 
World Order, refused to be subjected to the same tirades again. Of more 
importance, the Turks refused to admit the Kurdish refugees because of the 
volatile situation in the southeast. The degree of threat perceived by the 
Turks is evidenced by the fact that on April 2 the National Security Council 
(the High Command and the most senior politicians) and not the civilian 
Cabinet was convened to deal with the refugee issue [Kirisci 1993: 5],
Initially, Bush refused to be drawn into the situation but was subjected to 
intense pressure from both Prime Minister Major and President Ozal. 
Additional pressure came from the world, and particularly, US media. 
Perhaps making up for their subservient role during Operation Desert Storm, 
the media, especially television, brought scenes of Kurdish suffering into the 
living rooms of Middle America [Korn 1991], The plight of the Shia were
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ignored because the media were forbidden access to the south of Iraq. The 
latter brings up the thought that perhaps the Turkish government had initiated 
the blanket media coverage. Although no evidence exists to support this 
contention, the circumstances tend to point in that direction.
Caving into intense pressure from home and abroad, Bush supported 
Resolution 688 in the UN Security Council. Resolution 688 condemned Iraq's 
repression of its citizens, demanded that Baghdad desist from continuing the 
repression and insisted that Iraq permit 'immediate access by international 
humanitarian organisations to all those in need of assistance in all parts of 
Iraq' [UNSC Resolution 688, 5/4/91 quoted in Editors, US News & World 
Report 1992: 437], Three days later, John Major, prompted by Margaret 
Thatcher, [Freedman & Karsh 1993: 423] took up Ozal's suggestion that a 
'safe haven' be set up in northern Iraq. Major used the term 'enclave'. 
Apparently, he initially proposed an autonomous region for the Kurds but 
the Turks baulked at the idea [McDowall 1992: 118]. Major announced his 
plan at an EC summit, mindful that so public an arena would spur the US into 
taking some form of action. The White House 'damned (the idea) with
faintpraise - it had "some m erits.... at least worthy of consideration"'
[Freedman & Karsh 1993: 423],
Although Democrats demanded action [Korn 1991] Bush still insisted that 
he 'did not want one single soldier or airman shoved into a civil war in Iraq 
that has been going on for ages' [Bush speech 13/4/91 quoted in Freedman & 
Karsh 1993: 423-4], Five days before, Baker had visited northern Iraq. (The 
idea came from his press spokeswoman, Margaret Tutwiler) [Baker 1995: 
429], Baker was emotionally affected by the visit He called Bush and
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convinced him of the gravity of the situation and within hours Operation 
Provide Comfort was born. The safe havens were not created until April 16 
when Bush finally acquiesced.
The benefits of Operation Provide Comfort cannot be denied, however, the 
Bush administration's tardiness in becoming involved and their reasons for 
doing so are questionable. As noted above, it took the world media, and the 
leaders o f Turkey and the UK to gain the president's attention. In addition, the 
catalyst that eventually pushed the White House into action, Baker's visit to 
northern Iraq, grew out of a publicity stunt thought up by Margaret Tutwiler, 
Baker's spokeswoman. The reasoning behind the decision was not solely 
humanitarian as Robert Gates, Bush's Deputy National Security Advisor 
admitted in a recent interview for American television. 'The President wasn't 
as moved as (B aker).... I think that the decision to act was primarily
motivated by two factors. The first was pragmatic.... the concern of our ally
Turkey. We still needed Turkish co-operation .... (it was) still a major staging 
base for US forces, (Turkey was) opposite Iraq and so on. So their concerns 
about the Kurds were an important factor for us and a sort of hardheaded 
world o f geo-politics, I also think that there was a humanitarian element to it' 
(emphasis added) [PBS Frontline 1996],
Despite the larger movement of Kurdish refugees towards the Iranian border, 
the 'safe haven' was limited to the province of Dohuk which abuts Turkey.
The Iranian response was ambiguous. At first they requested that the safe 
haven be extended towards the east to include the larger Kurdish region 
bordering Iran. When they were ignored they opposed the safe haven - 
perhaps they saw the establishment of the safe haven as the beginnings of a
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another, Western-inspired 'Israel' [Ala 'Aldeen 1994: 234], It appears, 
therefore, that Operation Provide Comfort, in the eyes of the White House 
was an 'attempt to appease the Turks' [Ala 'Aldeen 1994: 234] as suggested 
by Gates.
It is also significant that the West made no attempt to create a safe haven in 
southern Iraq for the Shia nor was the West interested in Turkish atrocities 
against its Kurds [Chomsky 1994: 15]. On August 27 1992, the White House 
declared a 'no-fly zone' below the 32nd parallel but by then Baghdad had been 
permitted fourteen months' grace to pacify the area. A Pentagon spokesman 
stressed that 'the allies (were) establishing "a no-fly zone, not a security zone"
- meaning (as the reporter noted) that the allies have no intention of offering 
the Shiite population blanket protection from government attacks, as they had 
for the Kurds last year in Operation Provide Comfort' [LA Times 27/8/92:
Part A, Page 1] , At this point, an election loomed and Bush was trailing Bill 
Clinton badly at the polls and the victorious shine of Desert Storm had worn 
off. Bush denied that the no-fly zone was an election ploy. He 'was motivated 
only by "new evidence of harsh repression" by Saddam Hussein' [LA Times 
27/8/92: Part A, Page 1].
The Kurdish Election - 1992
On 19 May 1992, Kurds in the safe haven voted in not only the first 
democratic Kurdish election but also the first democratic election on Iraqi 
soil. The PUK and the KDP received almost equal support ( 43.8% and 
45.5% respectively) and gained virtually all the seats in the 105 seat 
assembly [Prince 1993: 18-19], For the Kurds the election manifested long-
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desired hopes for self-determination. Optimism, however, soon turned to 
pessimism because of the close vote between the PUK and the KDP. A dual
leadership emerged which lacked a 'clear division of pow er.... causing
renewed friction and bloodshed' [Bengio 1995: 80],
In Iraq and neighbouring states, the impending election elicited only general 
alarm. To gain Turkish acquiescence the Kurds were forced to agree to help 
Turkey in its war against the PKK insurrection. The United States greeted the 
election with trepidation. Initially, the State Department attempted to 
discourage it. Representatives from the International Human Rights Law 
Group in Washington D C., invited as observers by the Kurds, were 
threatened with prosecution if they chose to go because special permission 
was required by American citizens to enter Iraq and State refused to supply 
the permission. The State Department also proscribed the use of the term 
'Kurdistan' in relation to northern Iraq [Korn 1994],
Once preparations for the election were set in motion the US State 
Department issued a statement wishing the voters ('Turcomans, Assyrians and 
Kurds' - in that order) well but noted that the election was designed to resolve 
'local administrative issues' and not a preliminary move towards 'separatism.' 
The statement further reiterated the US goverment's support for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state of Iraq.' US official observers 
would not be attending the election, the statement concluded, because US 
passports were not valid for Iraq without 'a special State Department 
validation' and these would not be issued because of the dangerous situation 
in northern Iraq' [Tutwiler statement 15/5/92 in US State Dept Dispatch 
18/5/92].
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Once again, US foreign policy had subverted Kurdish self-determination in the 
interests of the regional balance of power. As had occurred at the end of the 
Kuwait War, their argument was based on the legal question of the territorial 
integrity of Iraq. Of interest is the fact that the territorial integrity of Iraq had 
been breached when Operation Provide Comfort and the safe haven had been 
instituted. Bush had initially argued that international law prohibited the safe 
haven but under congressional and public pressure chose to ignore it. Now, 
the legality of the safe haven was again a matter of dispute because it suited 
US national interest.
Iraq's legal rights were relegated to second place six months later when 
Turkey mounted an invasion into northern Iraq. Fifteen thousand soldiers 
penetrated up to twenty five kilometers into Iraq in, as Turkey claimed, 
pursuit of PKK guerillas. Some of the areas attacked were not PKK 
controlled. An Iraqi Kurdish spokesman claimed that the Turkish forces' 
major targets were the Iraqi Kurds not the PKK [Bengio 1995: 82-4], 
According to the State Department, because the PKK was a terrorist 
organisation, Turkey had 'legitimate rights' to enter northern Iraq and subdue 
them. No mention was made of Iraq's territorial integrity [US State Dept. 
Daily Press Briefing 8/10/92],
Before the Kuwait War, both the Reagan and Bush administrations had 
ignored the plight of the Kurds because Kurdish self-determination, if not 
survival, conflicted with US national interests. With the war over, and 
Saddam Hussein still ensconced in power, the Bush administration was forced 
to take some account of the Kurds but Kurdish self-determination remained 
inimical to the maintenance of United States' interests in the Middle East.
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CONCLUSION
Although US policy towards the Kurds, from the late 1940s until the late 
1960s, was indirect it had a profound effect. Attempts to stifle Arab 
nationalism through support for the Baghdad Pact and subsequently CENTO, 
arming of the Shah and destabilisation of successive Iraqi governments 
furthered Kurdish demands for self-determination. Kurdish self-determination 
was, however, as antipathetic to US national interests as Arab nationalism. 
Covert support for Barzani's KDP was not given with the intention that the 
Kurds achieve success. The Kurds were merely another pawn in the game of 
Middle Eastern realpolitik. Concrete evidence of this is established by the fact 
that when, in 1969, US officers were meeting with Barzani in Iraq, in Turkey 
at the same time, US trained commandos were suppressing Kurds in the 
southeast.
The US justified its realpolitik in the Middle East on the grounds that it was 
engaged in the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Its defence, however, is hard 
to reconcile with the fact that the Soviets were simultaneously supplying the 
KDP with arms, destabilising Iraq and attempting to gain influence with Iran. 
Both superpowers appear to have had identical policy ends: access to oil, 
suppression of an Iraq able to dominate the Arab world and friendship with 
Iran. In this respect, Soviet designs appear to have been less involved in 
communist expansion and more to do with equitable access to Middle East 
markets.
The Nixon-Kissinger involvement with the Shah could be interpreted as a mis-
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application of the principles of realist foreign policy making. Both appear to 
have been seduced by the Shah; Nixon, when vice-president under 
Eisenhower, and Kissinger, as Nixon's National Security Advisor [Nixon 
1978: 133, Kissinger 1979: 1258fifj. Apparently, both permitted self-delusion 
to translate into unquestioning support for the Shah. Gaddis has argued this 
phenomenon was symptomatic of Kissinger's approach to regional policy 
formulation. Kissinger, according to Gaddis, failed to interpret regional 
problems in a regional context, preferring to translate the overarching 
superpower rivalry into all situations that developed [Gaddis 1982: 333-4],
From a realist perspective, there may be some grounds for accepting Gaddis' 
critique; afterall, Saddam Hussein's lurch towards the Soviet Union was the 
catalyst for Nixon and Kissinger's decision to provide covert aid to the 
Kurdish insurrection in Iraq.
Saddam Hussein's policy shift was, however, strategic, not ideological. His intention 
was to gain a de facto  security umbrella to stabilise the Iraqi political situation 
and nationalise the Iraqi oil industry. He had learnt something from the 
Mossadeq disaster, while the Americans would not learn their lesson until 
1979, when the Shah was overthrown. Soviet impact was limited because 
Saddam successfully played the Soviets off against the French. Also, the 
Soviets were still intent on establishing a relationship with Iran as their 
subsequent denial of arms to Iraq proved.
Kissinger may have erred in pinning too much hope on the Shah but 
Kissinger used the Kurdish problem to solve the impasse between Israel and 
Egypt in the aftermath of the 1973 war. The Kurdish insurrection also denied 
the Iraqis the ability to effectively participate in the 1973 Arab-Israeli War.
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The relationship between the Kurdish-Iraq civil war and the Arab-Israeli War 
provides further evidence of Kissinger's motives in the Middle East. Kissinger 
was quite prepared for the Kurds to reduce Iraq's ability to fight in the war 
but he was against the Kurds denying Iraq total participation. During the war, 
'Israeli paramilitary advisors suggested to the Kurds that now was the time for 
a big offensive against Iraq. Barzani thought this a good idea; the White 
House did not. On October 16, 1973, Kissinger instructed the Director of the 
CIA to order the Kurds not to make the attack. Barzani relented' [Prados 
1986: 314], Obviously, Kissinger didn't want the Israelis to be too successful. 
An overwhelming Israeli victory would have destroyed any chance of peace in 
the Middle East and Sadat would have been unable to continue his move 
towards the West which Kissinger so highly desired. Perhaps Kissinger hadn't 
mistakenly translated the overarching superpower rivalry into the situation as 
Gaddis claims.
Kissinger and Nixon may have failed to predict the effect their support and 
massive arms sales would have on the eventual downfall of the Shah but as 
was discussed in chapter two, the United States soon found a new proxy in 
the form of Iraq. And despite the oil price increase in 1973 and the 
subsequent inflationary pressures on Western economies, major American 
corporations (oil companies, arms manufacturers and development firms) 
found a secure market in the Middle East and reaped massive profits. 
The containment of Iraq ensured that revolutionary nationalism was impeded 
for most of the 1970s: Arab nationalism, Palestinian and Kurdish self- 
determination were held in check. Revisionist history is, therefore, correct in 
asserting that Cold War foreign policy had more to do with protecting 
American interests than containing Soviet expansion. If anything, the
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Friendship Treaty gave the United States the pretext to further assert its 
influence in the region thus ensuring increased control over Middle Eastern 
oil, OPEC's attempts to assert its independence notwithstanding.
The Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy is probably best articulated in Nixon's first 
annual report on foreign policy which Kissinger drafted:
'Our objective, in the first instance, is to support our interests over the long run with a 
sound foreign policy. The more that policy is based on a realistic assessment of our and 
others' interests, the more effective our role in the world can be. We are not involved in the 
world because we have commitments; we have commitments because we are involved. Our 
interests must shape our commitments, rather than the other way round.' (emphasis in 
original) ['First Annual Report to the Congress on United States foreign policy' for the 
1970s', 18/2/70, in Nixon Papers, 1970 vol., p. 119. quoted in Kissinger, Diplomacy, 1994, 
711-12].
Support for the Kurds fell into the 'interest' basket rather than 'commitment', 
and the Iraqi Kurds lost out on all counts. If they had accepted the autonomy 
deal initially offered by Saddam Hussein, perhaps, they would have gained the 
respite necessary to co-ordinate their opposition to the regime in Baghdad. 
Continuing the insurrection only led to further suffering. Barzani failed to 
take heed of the important lesson of the Mahabad Republic. Also Barzani, 
foolishly believed that the United States would be more honourable than 
either the Soviets or the Shah had been in 1945, forgetting that British and 
US pressure had forced the hand of the Soviet Union in the first place. 
Barzani's blind faith in the Americans also led to further fragmentation of the 
Kurdish cause when the young, educated rebels defected to form the PUK.
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The Khomeini regime precipitated the downfall of Jimmy Carter and with 
Carter's loss, came Reagan's electoral gain. (And an even greater gain for the 
US military-industrial complex.) It is difficult to defend the Reagan policy 
towards Iran during the Iran-Iraq War as one solely based on containment.
The duplicitous support of both sides belies this argument. Although the 
failure of both sides to achieve victory permitted the United States to 
maintain its hegemony in the region and maintain a cheap supply of oil, it also 
permitted US business to reap massive profits from the sale of arms, not 
only from the protagonists, but also from fearful neighbouring states. When a 
ceasefire was mediated by the US and the Soviet Union, American business 
continued to reap benefits through tax-payer subsidised loans and credits to 
Iraq.
The Kurdish insurrections in Iraq and Iran also indirectly furthered .American 
aims. Because of their failure to unite, the Kurds achieved little for 
themselves but provided the United States with nuisance value in the war. A 
Kurdish success would have been a threat to US interests. A Kurdish state 
would have been a loose cannon undermining the territorial integrity of Iran, 
Iraq and Turkey. When Saddam Hussein launched the Anfal campaign against 
the Kurds it was also not in US national interest, strategically or 
economically, to intervene. Once again the Kurds were sacrificed to 
expediency. Furthermore, the Iran-Iraq War permitted the Turkish military to 
continue its suppression of the Kurds with impunity.
America's response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait stands in stark contrast to its 
reaction to Iraq's Anfal campaign. The latter elicited few of the emotions of
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the former despite the comparative lack of brutality of Iraqi troops in 
Kuwait. Bush's shock and horror at the invasion reflected a more atavistic 
fear; the loss of US hegemony in the Middle East. The subsequent war 
permitted Bush to punish a disobedient proxy. When this was achieved,
Bush's main concern was the maintenance of the territorial integrity of Iraq. 
After it became apparent that Saddam Hussein would not be dislodged by 
elements within his armed forces, Bush initiated a program designed to stifle 
Kurdish and Shia self-determination. If the Western media hadn't brought the 
Kurdish refugee problem to the world's attention, Saddam Hussein may have 
succeeded in annihilating them; no doubt with the complicity of the Turkish 
military.
The United States, Iran, Iraq and Turkey should not be forced to shoulder all 
the blame for the plight of the Kurds. The Kurds are not innocent either. 
Historically, and as noted in the divisions of the PUK and the KDP, they have 
failed to unite against their oppressors. More often than not one group of 
Kurds has chosen to collaborate with its host state against another group. The 
major reason for this is the tribal nature of Kurdish society.
As discussed in chapter one, Barzani was essentially a tribal leader. His son, 
who continues to lead the KDP, maintains his position through tribal support. 
Urbanised Iraqi Kurds resented and disavowed tribal support which led to the 
formation of the PUK. The rifts between the PUK and the KDP continues to 
this day, despite outside attempts at mediation; the most recent in Dublin last 
year Again, the outsiders are not interested in uniting the KDP and the PUK 
for the sake of Kurdish self-determination. The United States and Turkey, the 
major sponsors of the peace talks, are more interested in suppressing the PKK
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which poses a greater threat to US and Turkish interests. The Iraqi Kurds continue to 
live in their safe haven at the pleasure of the United States and Turkey. Should they 
attempt to assert any degree of independence, protection would be withdrawn. This 
would result in further oppression from Baghdad. The Kurds are aware of this and 
tread lightly in their relationship with Turkey.
In March and April 1995, Turkey invaded the safe haven in pursuit of PKK 
guerillas. Despite Turkey's claims to the contrary, often the targets were 
either Iraqi Kurds or Turkish Kurds who had sought refuge from the war in 
the southeast. The United States acquiesced to Turkey's invasion to the point 
that American aircraft, ostensibly in the region to protect Kurds from 
aggression, were grounded. Once again, an American administration paid 
scant regard to the territorial integrity of Iraq. While the Europeans objected 
vociferously, the United States' response was mute. When evidence 
eventually pointed to Turkish human rights abuses, the United States called 
for Turkey's quick withdrawal from Iraq. Little pressure, however, was placed 
on the Turkish government.
Turkey is now too important to US interests in the region to occasion 
punishment for transgressions of international law. Central to American 
foreign policy is containment of both Iraq and Iran. Turkey is the new US 
'policeman' of the Gulf entrusted with its implementation . Despite Turkey's 
human rights record, (much of it documented by the US State Department), 
and congressional opposition, the Clinton administration continues to supply 
Turkey with attack helicopters, cluster bombs and other arms which the 
Turkish military uses against both Iraqi and Turkish Kurds. Little has
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changed, therefore, in the last fifty years. The Kurds continue to be subject to 
US national interest.
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NOTES
Introduction
’ 'Dirk Hoerder .... calls the Revolutionary leadership "the Sons of Liberty type drawn from the
middling interest and well-to-do merchants ....  a hesitant leadership," wanting to spur action
against Great Britain, yet worrying about maintaining control over the crowds at home.' Zinn, A 
People's History o f the United States, 1980, p.65-6
2 A rebuttal of the opposing realist and neo-realist arguments is not within the scope of this essay. 
Hopefully, the essay itself will refute their supposed value.
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NOTES
Chapter One
1 Wilson's commitment to self-determination is suspect given that during his two administrations 
(1913-21) the United States invaded and / or interfered with Mexico (1914-17, 1918-19), Haiti 
(1915), Cuba (1917), Soviet Russia (1918-) et al. Apparently Wilson's view of self-determination 
was predicated on the idea that it should only apply to ethnic groups subject to European 
colonialism but not those subject to US 'manifest destiny'. In this respect his idealism seems akin to 
that of Franklin D. Roosevelt whose calls during the Second World War for self-determination after 
Germany and Japan's defeat appear to have been based on the subtext that dissolution of colonial 
empires would provide new markets for American business, {cf Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten 
History, 1986. Appendix II, Chomsky Year 501: The Conquest Continues, 1993)
2 The Shah was also threatened by Iranian Kurdish insurrectionists. Part of the deal to continue 
supplying Barzani with arms was a stipulation that the Iraqi KDP would desist from assisting the 
Iranian KDP [Chaliand, The Kurdish Tragedy, 1994, p,61],
?In 1971, forty thousand Kurds were deported to Iran on the pretext, no doubt dubious, that they 
were illegal immigrants. Also, during 1972, tens of thousands of Kurds left the province due to the 
pressure caused by Saddam's transfer of Iraqi Arabs to northern Iraq.
4 According to the secret agreement the Americans would supply arms and training on the following 
conditions: 1. only high ranking Kurds were to be informed of the deal, 2. Barzani would overthrow 
the Ba'ath, 3. Barzani would accept no aid from the Soviets, 4. the KDP would create no problems 
for the Shah and 5. no communists were to be involved in Barzani's insurrection. Entessar Kurdish 
Ethnonationalism 1992, p. 119. Barzani attempted to fulfil most of the conditions but refused to give 
up his Soviet aid. According to Timmerman, {The Death Lobby, 1993, p. 12/ Barzani was in receipt 
of Soviet aid until atleast the signing of the 1972 Friendship Treaty between Iraq and the USSR, if 
not later.
5 The full Pike Report has never been released. Sections of the report were published in New York's 
Village Voice weekly newspaper on 16 and 23 February', 1976. The report was also referred to by 
William Safire in two of his columns for the New York Times on 5 and 12 February', 1976. The New 
York Times declined to publish the report in its news pages. In addition, details of the report were 
published in the French newspaper L'Express from 8 -14 March 1976.
6 Barzani is also credited with declaring that he would make ’Kurdistan' the 51st state of the US. 
Blum, The CIA: A Forgotten History, 1994, [CD-ROM ednj And when Kissinger was married, he 
sent a wedding present, the existence of which was kept secret from the American public. Vanly, 
'Kurdistan in Iraq' in Chaliand (ed), A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, (2nd 
edn), 1993, p. 170
According to a CIA memo dated 17/10/72, the Shah had offered peace to the Iraqis two months 
after the US and Iran started to back the Kurds. The central demand from the Shah related to Iraq
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'publicly abrogating an old frontier treaty' concerning the Shatt-al-arab. At that time, Saddam 
Hussein was not ready to negotiate. Pike Report quoted in Vanly, op.cit., p. 171
s Later Kissinger was more contrite. In a newspaper column on the Kurdish tragedy following the 
1991 Kuwait War, Kissinger said that his 1975 decision had been "painful, even heartbreaking.'" 
ibid p.564 (Body7 and footnote quote). Whether much stock can be placed in Kissinger's latter-day 
contrition is doubtful considering that Kissinger has continually defended his and Nixon's secret 
war in Cambodia (Kissinger, Years o f Upheaval 1982, pp. 335ff and pp. 1217-1230, Kissinger, 
Diplomacy, 1994, pp.692ff) and Kissinger and Associates were prime movers of the US investment 
drive into Iraq in the late 1980s. ( Conason, 'The Iraqi Lobby', The New Republic, 1/10/90, 14-16)
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NOTES
Chapter Two
' 'It wasn't that we wanted Iraq to win the war; we did not want Iraq to lose. We really weren't 
naive. We knew (Saddam) was an S.O.B., but he was our S O B.' Geoffrey Kemp, head of the 
Middle East section in the Reagan White House. Miller & Mylroie, Saddam Hussein and the Crisis 
in the Gulf, 1990, p. 143. quoted in Smith. George Bush's War, 1992, p.43.
2 In mid 1980 the Kurds controlled 120.000 sq. kms of Iranian Kurdistan. When Iran had the upper 
hand in the war they launched an offensive against the Kurds. By early 1984. the Kurdish controlled 
region had been virtually eliminated. McDowall. The Kurds: A Divided Nation, 1992, pp.75-77.
3 Sick alleges that the Reagan campaign staff were fearful that Carter would pull off an 'October 
Surprise' before the 1980 election and obtain the release of the American hostages in Iran, thus 
guaranteeing his re-election in November. According to Sick, William Casey (then Reagan's 
campaign director and subsequently CIA director) and George Bush supported by intelligence and 
foreign policy officials disenchanted with the Carter administration negotiated a secret deal with 
Tehran to postpone the release of the hostages until Reagan was president in return for arms 
supplies - the beginnings of the Iran-Contra scandal. The hostages were released 20 minutes after 
Reagan was inaugurated president on 20 January, 1980, Considering the way, Casey subsequently 
directed the CIA, there may be some truth to the allegations, ( c f : Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars 
o f the CIA 1981-87) Sick, October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election o f Ronald 
Reagan, 1991 Also see Hitchens, 'Minority Report' column. The Nation, 22/4/91, 511, Com, 
'Probing "October Surprise": Leads Congress Should Pursue', The Nation, 24/6/91, 844-846 and 
Cornduff and Corrigan, 'The October Surprise', Z magazine, June 1991.
4 A Social Democratic Populist Party (SHP) report published in Turkey in 1986 alleged that eastern 
Turkey was 'a sort of concentration camp .... (with) every citizen a suspect.' McDowall, op.cit., p.47.
5 c f  Cockburn & Cohen, op.cit. Contra: Telhami ( 'Between Theory and Fact: Explaining US 
Behaviour in the Gulf Crisis' in Ismael & Ismael (eds), The Gulf War and the New World Order, 
1994, 153-183) disputes this assertion claiming that by the spring of 1990, the US was turning away 
from Iraq. She cites as evidence Saddam's speech in early 1990 warning Arab leaders that the US 
was now the major power in the region and the Arab states should therefore consider withdrawing 
their investments in the Western world and perhaps re-invest in Eastern Europe and Russia. She 
contends that the US reacted to this speech by cooling relations with Iraq. Telhami's argument is 
unique in studies of the period and appears to contradict the available evidence. The administration 
did withdraw CCC credits to Iraq, however, this decision seems to have been precipitated by the 
brewing scandal that came to be known as Iraqgate. cf. references cited in note 8.
6 For detailed accounts of the relationship see Karabell, 'Backfire: US Policy Toward Iraq, 1988-2 
August 1990', Middle East Journal, vol 49, no.l, (Winter 1995), 28-47, Gigot, 'A Great American 
Screw-Up: The US and Iraq, 1980-1990', The National Interest, 22, (Winter 1990/91), 3-10, 
Cockburn & Cohen. 'The Unnecessary War' in Brittain (ed), The Gulf Between Us: The Gulf War 
and Beyond, 1991, pp. 1-25, Timmerman, The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq, 1992,
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Darwish & Alexander, Unholy Babylon: The Secret History o f Saddam's War, 1991 and Hitchens. 
'Realpolitik in the Gulf: A Game Gone Tilt', Harper's, January 1991, in Sifry & Cerf (eds), The Gulf 
War Reader, 1991, pp. 107-118.
N.B. In the discussion that follows I am not attempting to infer or allege that members of the Bush 
and Reagan administrations engaged in criminal activities in their relationships with American 
companies and the government of Iraq and its representatives.
^For a detailed examination of 'Iraqgate' see Friedman. Spider's Web, 1993, Timmerman. The Death 
Lobby, 1992, Pizzo, Fricker & Hogan, 'Shredded Justice', Mother Jones, January/February 1993, 
Pizzo, 'Dirty Justice'. Mother Jones, March/April 1993, Safire, 'Cover-Up Triumphs', San Francisco 
Chronicle, 21/2/95, A17, 'Justice Dept. Finds There Was No "Iraqgate"', Arms Sales Monitor 28, 
(15/2/95), 4, 'Bush Administration Cleared in Iraqgate'. San Francisco Chronicle, 24/1/95, A3, and 
Juster, 'The Myth of Iraqgate', Foreign Policy, 94, (Spring 1994), 105-119, Karabell, "Backfire: US 
Policy Toward Iraq. 1988 - 2 August 1990', Middle East Journal, 49/1, (Winter 1995), 28-47
y For Bush see 'A Collective Effort to Reverse Iraqi Aggression', 22 and 30 August 1990. Current 
Policy 1296 (Washington DC: US Dept of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. 1990) cited in Telhami, 
op.cit., 154. Baker initially argued that the invasion threatened American jobs. When this didn't 
wash with the American people or Congress, he changed his tack and began to argue that the 
invasion threatened oil supplies. Baker, The Politics o f Diplomacy, 1995, p.335ff.
68
BIBLIOGRAPHY
BOOKS
AHMAD, Farouz, The Making o f Modern Turkey, London & New York, Routledge, 
1993.
ALA 'ALDEEN, Dlawer, 'Playing by the Rules' in Hazelton, F. (ed) Iraq Since the 
Gulf War: Prospects for Democracy, London, Zed Books, 1994
ATKINSON, Rick, CRUSADE: The Untold Story o f the Gulf War, London, Harper 
Collins Publishers, 1994.
BAHCHELI, Tozun, 'Turkey, the Gulf Crisis, and the New World Order' in Ismael, 
T.Y. and Ismael, J S. (eds) The Gidf War and the New World Order: International 
Relations o f the Middle East, Gainesville, FL, University Press of Florida, 1994 
pp.435-450.
BAKER, James A., Ill, The Politics o f Diplomacy: Revolution, War & Peace, 
1989-1992, New York, G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995.
BELL, Coral, The Reagan Paradox: American Foreign Policy in the 1980s, 
Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1989.
BILL, James A. & SPRINGBORG, Robert, Politics in the Middle East, (4th edn) 
New York, Harper Collins College Publishers, 1994.
BLUM, William, The CIA: A Forgotten History 1986 on The CIA Papers, 
(CD-ROM), Cambridge, MA, Chestnut New Media, 1994.
CANNON, Lou, President Reagan: The Role o f a Lifetime, New York, Simon & 
Schuster, 1991.
CHALIAND, Gerard, The Kurdish Tragedy, London & New Jersey, Zed Books, 
1994
CHOMSKY, Noam, "'What we say goes": The Middle East in the New World Order' 
in Peters, C. (ed) Collateral Damage: The New World Order at Home and Abroad, 
Boston MA, South End Press, 1992 pp. 49-92.
_____________Year 501: the Conquest Continues, London, Verso, 1993.
69
_____________, World Orders, Old and New, London, Pluto Press, 1994.
COCKBURN, Alexander & COHEN, Andrew, 'The Unnecessary War' in Brittain, V. 
(ed) The Gulf Between Us: The Gulf War and Beyond, London, Virago Press, 1991,
pp.1-26.
COCKBURN, Andrew & Leslie, Dangerous Liaison: The Inside Story o f the 
US-Israeli Covert Relationship, New York, Harper Collins Publishers, 1991.
DARWISH, Adel and ALEXANDER, Gregory, Unholy Babylon: The Secret History 
of Saddam's War, London, Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1991.
EDEN, Anthony, Sir, Full Circle: The Memoirs o f the Rt. Hon. Sir Anthony Eden, 
London, Cassell, 1960.
EDITORS US NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Triumph Without Victory: Hie History 
of the Persian Gulf War,New York, Times Books, 1993.
FREEDMAN, Lawrence & KARSH, Efraim, The Gulf Conflict: Diplomacy and War 
in the New World Order, London & Boston, faber & faber, 1993.
ENTESSAR, Nader, Kurdish Ethnonationalism, Boulder CO and London, Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1992.
FREEDMAN, Lawrence and KARSH, Efraim, The Gulf Conflict: 1990-1991, 
London, faber and faber, 1993.
FRIEDMAN, Alan, Spider's Web: The Secret History o f how the White House 
illegally armed Iraq, New York, Bantam Books, 1993.
GADDIS, John Lewis, Strategies o f Containment: A Critical Appraisal o f Postwar 
American National Security Policy, Oxford, OUP, 1982.
GHASSEMLOU, A.R., 'Kurdistan in Iraq' in Chaliand, G. (ed), A People Without a 
Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, New York, Olive Branch Press, 1993, 
pp.95-121.
GUNTER, Michael M , The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma, Boulder CO, 
Westview Press, 1990.
70
HALLIDAY, Fred, 'The Impact of Soviet Policy in the Middle East' in Shearman, P.
& Williams, P. (eds), The Superpowers, Central America and the Middle East, 
London, Brassey's Defence Publishers, 1988, pp. 155-167.
HENZE, Paul B., 'Why Turkey is not a Friendly Tyrant' in Pipes, D. & Garfinkle, A. 
(eds), Friendly Tyrants: An American Dilemma, London, Macmillan, 1991, 
pp.91-108.
HITCHENS, Christopher, 'Realpolitik in the Gulf: A Game Gone Tilt' in Sifry, M L. 
and Cerf, C. (eds), The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, New York, 
Times Books, 1991, pp. 107-118.
HOFF, Joan, 'American Diplomacy: Retrospect and Prospect' in Martel, G (ed) 
American Foreign Relations Reconsidered 1890-1995, London & New York, 
Routledge, 1994, pp.211-33.
_________ , Nixon Reconsidered, New York, Basic Books, 1994.
HOROWITZ, David, From Yalta to Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in the Cold 
War, Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1971.
ISAACSON, Walter, Kissinger: A Biography, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1992.
JENTLESON, Bruce W., With Friends Like These: Reagan, Bush and Saddam, 
1982-1990, New York & London, W. W. Norton & Company, 1994.
KARSH, Efraim & RAUTSI, Inari, Saddam Hussein: A Political Biography, 
London, Futura, 1991.
KENDAL, 'Kurdistan in Turkey' in Chaliand (ed), A People Without A Country: The 
Kurds and Kurdistan, New York, OliveBranch Press, 1993, pp.38-94.
KISSINGER, Henry, The White House Years, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson and 
Michael Joseph, 1979.
________________ , Diplomacy, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1994.
KOOHI-KAMALI, Fereshteh, 'The Development of Kurdish Nationalism in Iranian 
Kurdistan' in Kreyenbroek, P.G. and Sperl, S. (eds), The Kurds: A Contemporary 
Overview, London and New York, Routledge, 1992 pp. 171-192.
71
LaFEBER, Walter, 'From Detente to the Gulf in American Foreign Relations 
Reconsidered 1890-1993, London & New York, Routledge, 1994.
McDOWALL, David, The Kurds: A Nation Divided, London, Minority Rights 
Publications, 1992.
_________________ , 'The Kurdish Question: A Historical Review' in Kreyenbroek,
P.G. and Sperl, S. (eds), The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, London and New 
York, Routledge, 1992, pp. 10-32.
MERRILL, Dennis, 'The United States and the rise of the Third World' in Martel, G 
(ed), American Foreign Relations Reconsidered: 1890-1993, London & New York, 
Routledge, 1994.
MILLER, Judith & MYLROIE, Laurie, Saddam Hussein and the Crisis in the Gulf, 
New York, Times Books, 1990.
NIXON, Richard, The Memoirs o f Richard Nixon, London, Arrow Books, 1978.
PRADOS, John, Presidents' Secret Wars, New York, Quill & William Morrow, 
1986.
RABINOVICH, Itamar & REINHAZ, Jehuda, (eds) Israel in the Middle East: 
Documents and Readings on Society, Politics and Foreign Relations, 1948-Present, 
New York & Oxford, OUP, 1984.
ROOSEVELT, Archie, Jnr, 'The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad' in Chaliand (ed), A 
People Without A Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, New York, Olive Branch 
Press, 1993, pp. 122-137.
SAIKAL, Amin, The Rise and Fall o f the Shah: 1941-1979, Sydney, Angus and 
Robertson Publishers, 1980.
SCHWARZKOPF, General H. Norman, The Autobiography: It Doesn't Take A 
Hero, New York, Bantam Books, 1993.
SCOTT, P.D., 'US Hungry for Iraqi Petrodollars - not just oil' in Ridgeway , J. (ed), 
The March to War, New York, Four Walls Eight Windows, 1991, pp. 161-3.
SHAWCROSS, William, The Shah's Last Ride: The Fate o f an Ally, New York, 
Simon & Schuster, 1988.
72
SHERZAD, A., 'The Kurdish Movement in Iraq: 1975-1988' in Kreyenbroek, P.G. 
and Sperl, S. (eds), The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview, London and New York, 
Routledge, 1992 pp.134-142.
SHEIKHMOUS, A., 'The Kurdish Case in Iraq' in Rupesinghe (ed), Internal Conflict 
and Governance, New York, St Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 131-141.
SICK, Gary, October Surprise: America's Hostages in Iran and the Election o f  
Ronald Reagan, London & New York, IB . Tauris & Co. Ltd, 1991.
SIMPSON, C., National Security Directives o f the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations, Boulder, CO, Westview Press, 1995.
SLUGLETT, Peter and FAROUK-SLUGLETT, Marion, 'The Kurds' in Sluglett, P. 
and Farouk-Sluglett, M. (eds), The Times Guide to the Middle East: The Arab World 
and its Neighbours, London, Times Books, 1991 pp.51-67.
______________________________________________ , 'Iraq and the New World
Order' in Ismael, T. Y. and Ismael, J.S. (eds), The Gulf War and the New World 
Order: International Relations o f the Middle East, Gainesville, FL, University Press 
of Florida, 1994 pp.265-292.
SMITH, Jean Edward, George Bush’s War, New York, Henry Holt & Co, 1992.
SPAIN, James W , American Diplomacy in Turkey: Memoirs o f an Ambassador 
Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary, New York, Praeger, 1984.
TELHAMI, Shibley, 'Between Theory and Fact: Explaining US Behaviour in the Gulf 
Crisis' in Ismael & Ismael (eds), The Gulf War and the New World Order: 
International Relations o f the Middle East, Gainesville, FL, University Press of 
Florida, 1994, pp.153-183.
TIMMERMAN, Kenneth R., The Death Lobby: How the West Armed Iraq, London, 
Fourth Estate, 1992.
'Transcript of Meeting Between US Senators and Saddam Hussein, Baghdad,
12/4/90' in Ridgeway, J. (ed), The March to War, New York, Four Walls Eight 
Windows, 1991, pp.35-38.
73
VANLY, Ismet Sheriff, 'Kurdistan in Iraq' in Chaliand, G. (ed), A People Without a 
Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, New York, Olive Branch Press, 1993, 
pp. 139-194.
WAAS, Murray, 'What Washington Gave Saddam for Christmas' in Sifry, M L. and 
Cerf, C. (eds), The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions, New York, 
Times Books, 1991 pp.85-98.
WOODWARD, Bob, Veil: The Secret Wars o f the CIA 1981-1987 New York,
Simon & Schuster, 1987.
YERGIN, Daniel, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power, New York, 
Simon & Schuster, 1991
ZINN, Howard A., People's History o f the United States, New York, Harpers 
Coliins, 1980.
JOURNALS, REPORTS, NEWSPAPERS, ETC
BARKEY, Henri J., 'Turkey's Kurdish Dilemma', Survival, vol.35, no.4, (Winter 
1993), 51-70.
BENGIO, Ofra, 'The Challenge to the Territorial Integrity of Iraq', Survival, vol.37, 
no.2, (Summer 1995), 74-94.
BIERMAN, John, 'Hussein's Postwar Fury', Maclean's, vol. 104, (8/4/91), 36- 
(Internet)
'BNL to be paid $400 million in Agricultural Loan Guarantees', US Dept of Justice 
Press Release, 16/2/95.
'Bush Administration Cleared in Iraqgate', San Francisco Chronicle, 24/1/95, A3.
CHOMSKY, Noam, 'The Gulf Crisis', Z Magazine, February 1991, (The Chomsky 
Archive -Internet).
CONASON, Joe, 'Kissinger, The Business Forum, and Co.: The Iraq Lobby', The 
New Republic, 1/10/90, 14-16.
CORN, David, 'Probing "October Surprise": Leads Congress Should Pursue', The 
Nation, 24/6/91, 844-846.
DAVIDSON, Lawrence, Review of Suleiman, Michael W. (ed), US Policy on 
Palestine From Wilson to Clinton, Arab Studies Quarterly, vol. 17, no. 3, (Summer 
1995), 74-77
Decree Having the Force o f Law Concerning the Additional Measures to be Taken 
during the Term o f Office o f the State o f Emergency Regional Governor and the 
State o f Emergency, Official Gazette No. 20727, (Republic of Turkey), 1 6 / 1 2 / 9 0 .
ENTESSAR, Nader, 'The Kurdish Mosaic of Discord', Third World Quarterly, 
vol. 11, no.4, (Oct 1989), 83-100
FAROUK-SLUGLETT, Marion & SLUGLETT, Peter, 'Twentieth Century Iraq: 
History, Revolution, Reality', Current Affairs Bulletin, vol. 56, no. 10, (March 1980), 
4-15.
74
FRELICK, Bill, 'The False Promise of Operation Provide Comfort: Protecting 
Refugees or Protecting State Power?', Middle Exist Report, May-June 1992, 22-27.
FRIEDMAN, Alan & BARBER, Lionel, 'Congressional Inquiry: Kissinger's Firm 
Linked to BNL', Financial Times, 26/4/91.
GIGOT, Paul A., 'A Great American Screw-Up: The US and Iraq, 1980-1990', The 
National Interest, 22, (Winter 1990/91), 3-10.
GOMPERT, David, 'Enhanced US - Turkish Relationship', Press Briefing, The White 
House, Washington DC, 11/2/92 in Dispatch, vol.3, no.7, (17/2/92), US Department 
of State, USFAC, 1990-March 1995, Bureau of Public Affairs, US Dept of State, 
Washington DC, 1995.
GONZALEZ, Henry M., 'Letter to President George Bush from Henry M. Gonzalez, 
Chairman, House Committee on Banking and Urban Affairs, 2/5/9 T, cited in 
Congressional Record, May 1991 (Internet)
GUNTER, Michael M., 'A de facto  Kurdish state in Northern Iraq', Third World 
Quarterly, vol. 14, no.2, (1993), 295-319.
HASSANPOUR, Amir, 'The Kurdish Experience', Middle Exist Report, July-August 
1994, 2-23.
75
HITCHENS, Christopher, 'Minority Report', The Nation, 22/4/91, 511.
al-JABB AR, Faleh Abd, 'Why the Uprisings Failed', Middle East Report, May-June 
1992, 2-14.
JEHL, Douglas & BRODER, John M., "'No-Fly" Zone in Iraq Starts Today, Bush 
Says', Los Angeles Times, 27/8/92, Al.
JOFFE, George, 'Iraq's Strategic Role', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol.5, no.5, (May 
1993), 221-224.
JONES, George & JOHNSTON, Philip, 'Parliament Misled but there was no 
cover-up, says Scott', The Electronic Telegraph, 16/2/96, (Internet)
JUSTER, Kenneth I ,  'The Myth of Iraqgate', Foreign Policy, 94, (Spring 1994), 
105-119.
'Justice Dept. Finds There Was No Iraqgate'^r/ws Sales Monitor, 28, (15/2/95), 4 
(Internet).
KARABELL, Zachary, 'Backfire: US Policy Toward Iraq, 1988-2 August 1990', 
Middle East Journal, vol.49, no.l, (Winter 1995), 28-47.
KIRISCI, Kemal,' "Provide Comfort" and Turkey: Decision Making for Refugee 
Assistance', Research Papers: Bogazici Universitesi, ISS/POLS, 93-1, (1993).
KONDRACKE, Morton, 'Kurdled: What did the Administration Really Know?', The 
New Republic, 13 /5 / 91 ,  10-11.
KORN, David A., 'Iraq's Kurds: Why Two Million Fled', Foreign Sennce Journal, 
July 1991, CNN Newsroom: Global View. CD-ROM, London, Compact Publishing, 
1994.
Law to Light Terrorism, Official Gazette, (Republic of Turkey), 1 2 / 4 / 9 1 .
Notice o f Derogation in Conformity with Article 15 o f the European Convention o f 
Human Rights, Permanent Representative of Turkey to the Council of Europe, 
8/8/90.
OLSON, Robert, 'The Creation of a Kurdish State in the 1990's?', Journal o f South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, vol.XV, no.4, (Summer 1992), 1-25.
76
______________, 'The Kurdish Question in the Aftermath of the Gulf War:
geopolitical and geostrategic changes in the Middle East', Third World Quarterly, 
vol. 13, no.3, (1992), 475-499.
OTIS, Pauletta, 'Political and Military Considerations of the Kurdish Case 1991: A 
Window of Opportunity', Small Wars and Insurgencies, vol. 2, no. 1, (Apr 1991), 
61-90
PARRY, Robert, 'The Peace Feeler That Was', The Nation, 15/4/91, 480-2.
PBS Frontline, 'Interview with General Norman Schwarzkopf, Transcript from The 
Gulf War, broadcast 9-10 January, 1996, (USA), (Internet).
PBS Frontline, 'Interview with Robert M. Gates', Transcript from The Gulf War, 
broadcast 9-10 January, 1996, (USA), (Internet).
PERETZ, Martin, 'Unpromised Lands: The Statelessness of Kurds and Palestinians', 
The New Republic, 3/6/91, 20-23.
PIZZO, Stephen, FRICKER, Mary & HOGAN, Kevin, 'Shredded Justice', Mother 
Jones, January/February 1993, (Internet)
PRINCE, James M., 'A Kurdish State in Iraq?', Current History, vol.92, no.570, (Jan 
1993), 17-22.
SAFIRE, William, 'Cover-Up Triumphs', San Francisco Chronicle, 21/2/95, A17.
SALIH, Khaled, 'Anfal: The Kurdish Genocide in Iraq', Guteborgs Universitet, 1994.
'Scott Report: Questions were raised on government policy', The Times, 16/2/96, 
(Internet edition).
TEIMOURIAN, Hazhir, 'Turkey - The Challenge of the Kurdistan Workers' Party', 
Jane's Intelligence Review, vol. 5, no .l, (Jan. 1993),.29-32.
TUTWILER, Margaret, 'Northern Iraq Elections', US State Department Statement,
WALLER, David, 'The Glass House', The New Republic, 5/11/90, 13-14.
77
Washington DC, 1 5 / 5 / 9 2 ,  Dispatch, vol.3, no.20, 18/5/92, £/£ Department o f  
State, USFAC, 1990 - March 1995, CD-ROM, Washington DC, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, US Dept of State 1995.
WYLLIE, James, 'Turkey's Eastern Crisis', Jane's Intelligence Review, vol.5, no. 11, 
(Nov 1993),. 506-507.
